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INTRODUCTION 
For some, the Laurentian Great Lakes are a natural resource 
ripe with economic opportunity.1 For others, they offer a seemingly 
limitless and increasingly desirable source of the most fundamental 
and sustaining human need.2 For many, they are “crown jewels”3 
                                                 
 1. See MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE FUTURE: PROTECTING WATER FOR PEOPLE 
AND THE PLANET FOREVER 67 (The New Press 2014) (“[There] is a powerful clique 
of decision makers, politicians, international trade and financial institutions, 
economic advisors and academics, and transnational corporations who view water as 
a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market, like running shoes.”); see 
also INT’L JOINT COMM’N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: 2015 
REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FEBRUARY 2000 REPORT 4 (2015) 
[hereinafter IJC 2015 Review], http://ijc.org/files/tinymce/uploaded/Publications/ 
IJC_2015_Review_of_the_Recommendations_of_the_PWGL_January_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/372L-MG77] (“In 1998, . . . a Canadian entrepreneur proposed to 
ship Lake Superior water to Asia by marine tanker.”). 
 2. See Great Lakes Facts and Figures, LAKE ERIE WATERKEEPER, 
http://www.lakeeriewaterkeeper.org/lake-erie/great-lakes/ [https://perma.cc/H7C2-
SMHQ] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (noting that the Great Lakes contain “6 
quadrillion gallons of freshwater; one-fifth of the world’s fresh surface water (only 
the polar ice caps and Lake Baikal in Siberia contain more); 95 percent of the U.S. 
supply; [and] 84 percent of the surface water supply in North America” and that if 
“[s]pread evenly across the continental U.S., the Great Lakes would submerge the 
country under about 9.5 feet of water”); see also SHARING WATER IN TIMES OF 
SCARCITY: GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE 
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warranting the utmost preservation to ensure that they are stringently 
protected in accordance with public trust principles for generations to 
come.4 With this varying range and degree of perspectives,5 a clash 
over how to best manage, utilize, and safeguard the Great Lakes 
ecosystem is inevitable.6 Perplexing circumstances such as climate 
change, environmental degradation, and water shortages are all 
contributing to unprecedented confrontation over this indispensable 
component of the world’s surface freshwater supply.7 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                       
AGREEMENTS TO SHARE WATER ACROSS POLITICAL BOUNDARIES 2 (Stephen E. 
Draper ed., 2006) (“Water is central to survival of life itself, and without it plant and 
animal life would be impossible. Water is a central component of the Earth system, 
providing important controls on the world’s weather and climate. Water is also 
central to our economic well being.”) (citing Charles J. Vörösmarty, Global Water 
Assessment and Potential Contributions from Earth Systems Science, 64 AQUATIC 
SCI. 328, 328-51 (2002)); James Olson, All Aboard: Navigating the Course for 
Universal Adoption of the Public Trust Doctrine, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 140 
(2014) (“The freshwater seas of North America, the five Great Lakes and their 
connecting and tributary waters and ecosystems, represent nearly twenty percent of 
the world’s fresh surface water and are home to 35 million people spread over eight 
states and two provinces.”). 
 3. Russell A. Moll et al., The Great Lakes: An Overview of Their 
Formation, Geology, Physics, and Chemistry, in GREAT LAKES FISHERIES POLICY 
AND MANAGEMENT: A BINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (William W. Taylor, Abigail J. 
Lynch & Nancy J. Leonard eds., 2d ed. 2013) (“The Laurentian Great Lakes are the 
crown jewels of the freshwater systems of North America.”). 
 4. See BARLOW, supra note 1, at 67 (“They see water as a common 
heritage and a public trust to be conserved and managed for the public good.”); see 
also Olson, supra note 2, at 150 (“[T]he Great Lakes . . . are held in trust by the state 
for the benefit of the public.”). 
 5. See Noah D. Hall & Benjamin C. Houston, Law and Governance of the 
Great Lakes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 724 (2014) (“There is . . . no single human 
view towards the ‘environment,’ but rather a wide range of values that vary by 
individual, time, place, and the environmental decision at issue.”). 
 6. See id. at 725 (asserting that “[t]he diversity of values and interests in 
the Great Lakes creates a tremendous challenge when using law and governance to 
address emerging environmental issues”); see also James M. Olson, Great Lakes 
Water, MICH. B.J., Dec. 2001, at 33 (“With global water demand doubling every 20 
years, states, countries, and private companies understandably covet the Great 
Lakes.”). 
 7. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 725 (“The Great Lakes are beset 
by pollution from industry, afflicted by eutrophication due to agricultural fertilizers, 
invaded repeatedly by nonnative species, threatened by climate change, and eyed by 
more arid regions for diversions to ease water shortages in other areas of the 
country.”); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 142-43 (“[T]he Great Lakes basin and its 
ecosystem are in ecological crisis and face many challenges. These include a rapidly 
increasing demand and competition for freshwater; continuing influxes of invasive 
species such as quagga mussels; dead zones; loss of fish populations; climate 
change; increasing energy and food demands; and increasing demand for drinking 
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tension between balancing economic rights, human rights, and 
preservation interests is becoming all the more apparent.8 
June 21, 2016, was the apex of a thirteen-year clash over these 
interests as the governors of all eight Great Lakes states unanimously 
approved the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin’s application to divert 
water from Lake Michigan.9 This historical decision “mark[ed] the 
first test case of the Great Lakes Compact,”10 which expressly 
prohibits the diversion of water from the Great Lakes to places 
located outside the Great Lakes Basin.11 The Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes 
Compact) does leave room for exceptions to this nearly universal 
ban,12 specifically for those counties “that straddle the hydrological 
                                                                                                       
water. Although the governments and inhabitants have confronted many challenges 
to the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes commons have never been so threatened by so 
many potential losses, harms, or risks[] of such systemic or overwhelming 
magnitude.”); Letter from James M. Olson, President and Policy Advisor, FLOW 
(For Love of Water) to Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Water Resources Regional 
Body and Water Resources Council 13 (Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Comments on the 
Waukesha Diversion Application], http://flowforwater.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/FINAL-Waukesha-Regional-Body-Comments-3-01-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MSK3-67XP] (noting how “[i]n this second decade of the 21st 
century, it is more evident than ever that the Great Lakes face unprecedented 
geopolitical and systemic threats”). 
 8. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 724-25 (noting that “[t]o best 
understand the laws and governance of the Great Lakes, one must be objective in 
recognizing the diversity of values, interests, and priorities at play and acknowledge 
the fallacy of a single ‘best’ solution for everyone”). 
 9. See Don Behm, Great Lakes Governors Approve Waukesha Water 
Request, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 21, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/ 
news/waukesha/decision-day-arrives-for-waukeshas-lake-michigan-water-request-
b99747111z1-383762921.html [https://perma.cc/2CQD-TCJ5] (“On a historic 8-0 
vote, Waukesha won the water prize it sought for 13 years.”). 
 10. Keith Matheny, Waukesha Gets Permission to Draw Water from Lake 
Michigan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 21, 2016, 7:52 PM), http://www.freep.com/ 
story/news/local/michigan/2016/06/21/waukesha-gets-permission-draw-water-lake-
michigan/86187378/ [https://perma.cc/B3Y4-52TX]. 
 11. See Codi Kozacek, Waukesha Great Lakes Diversion Approved, CIRCLE 
BLUE (June 21, 2016), http://www.circleofblue.org/2016/great-lakes/waukesha-
great-lakes-diversion-approved/ [https://perma.cc/GS9F-67SF]; see also A. Dan 
Tarlock, The International Joint Commission and Great Lakes Diversions: 
Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 
1671, 1672-73 (2008). Canada also has its own strict anti-diversion legislation. Id. at 
1673. It enacted a strict federal anti-diversion law in 2002. Id. 
 12. See A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369, 392 (2010) (noting that communities falling into the exception 
category “must satisfy strict standards to access water”); see also Tarlock, supra 
note 11, at 1673 (“Even small communities that straddle the divide between the 
 Standing Under the Great Lakes Compact 255 
divide between the Great Lakes and other watersheds.”13 It is directly 
because of this straddling county exception that the Compact Council 
even considered the City of Waukesha’s diversion proposal in the 
first place.14 The City of Waukesha lies seventeen miles west of Lake 
Michigan in the Mississippi River Watershed,15 and it desperately 
needed an alternative water supply for its 70,000-member 
community because its current primary source is a radium-
contaminated and depleted sandstone aquifer.16 After numerous 
scientific studies and extensive analyses, the City concluded that 
Lake Michigan water was the only viable alternative source.17 
Consequently, the governors acted pursuant to their authority under 
the Compact and decided to allow the diversion of a maximum of 8.2 
million gallons of water per day.18 
Given the monumental significance of this decision and the 
contested debates that persisted throughout the application process, it 
is unsurprising that one challenge to the Waukesha Diversion quickly 
ensued.19 On September 16, 2016, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative (Cities Initiative), a nonprofit organization composed 
of over 120 mayors from United States and Canadian cities, sought a 
hearing to formally contest the Compact Council’s approval of the 
diversion.20 Because the key first step to pursuing potential 
objections is a party’s ability to establish standing under the 
                                                                                                       
Great Lakes and other drainages, which often includes a small part of a state, must 
meet a high standard to gain access to water located only a few miles away.”). 
 13. Kozacek, supra note 11. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See Evan Garcia & Paris Schutz, Unanimous Vote Gives Waukesha 
Access to Lake Michigan Drinking Water, CHI. TONIGHT (June 21, 2016, 3:22 PM), 
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/06/21/unanimous-vote-gives-waukesha-
access-lake-michigan-drinking-water [https://perma.cc/BSX4-JA2V] (noting that 
Waukesha is located about seventeen miles west of Lake Michigan). 
 16. See Matheny, supra note 10. 
 17. See Kozacek, supra note 11. 
 18. See Behm, supra note 9. 
 19. See Garret Ellison, Great Lakes Mayors Plan Legal Challenge to 
Waukesha Water Approval, MLIVE.COM (Aug. 26, 2016, 10:07 AM), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/08/great_lakes_mayors_plan_legal.html 
[https://perma.cc/SR3E-L4B3] (“An international group of Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence River mayors . . . request[ed] a formal hearing to challenge the recent 
decision to allow a Wisconsin city access to Lake Michigan as a source for drinking 
water.”). 
 20. See generally Written Statement in Furtherance of Request for Hearing 
and Compact Council Consideration, Case No. 2016-1 [hereinafter Cities Initiative 
Written Statement], https://glslcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Cities-
Initiative-Written-Statement-9-16-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HC2-8B98]. 
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“aggrieved person” standard in the Great Lakes Compact,21 both the 
Cities Initiative and the City of Waukesha extensively litigated this 
issue in their briefs and at oral argument.22 However, in its written 
opinion, the Compact Council consciously bypassed answering this 
threshold inquiry and proceeded to the merits of the Cities 
Initiative’s request, ultimately declining to reopen or modify its final 
decision.23 Though the Cities Initiative could have further appealed 
the matter and sought judicial review, it reached a settlement with 
the Compact Council, foreclosing the opportunity not only for 
review of its challenge, but also for a reviewing court to establish 
precedent on what it means to be “aggrieved” in this context.24 
Consequently, the issue of who qualifies as “aggrieved” under the 
                                                 
 21. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 7.3, 122 Stat. 3739, 3761 (2008). 
 22. See Cities Initiative Written Statement, supra note 20, at 13-14 
(containing the Cities Initiative initial standing argument); Supplement to Written 
Statement in Furtherance of Request for Hearing and Compact Council 
Consideration at 3-11, Case No. 2016-1 [hereinafter Cities Initiative Supplement to 
Written Statement], https://glslcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/12-19-16-
Supplement-to-Cities-Initiative-Written-Submission-FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J3P-
95M3] (building upon the standing arguments raised in its Written Statement); Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative’s Reply to City of Waukesha’s Response to 
the Cities Initiative’s Request for a Hearing at 5-12, Case No. 2016-1 [hereinafter 
Cities Initiative Reply], http://greatwateralliance.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/2-6-17-cities-initiative-reply.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8NG-
U3MA] (responding to the City of Waukesha’s standing arguments); see also City 
of Waukesha’s Response to the Cities Initiative’s Request for a Hearing at 6-15, 
Case. No. 2016-1 [hereinafter City of Waukesha’s Response], 
http://greatwateralliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/1-23-17-city-of-
waukesha-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2FE-UUNT] (containing the City of 
Waukesha’s standing objections). 
 23. See In re City of Waukesha, Diversion Hearing No. 2016-1 (May 4, 
2017) at 10, 51 [hereinafter In re City of Waukesha], 
http://www.glslcompactcouncil.org/Docs/Waukesha/Compact%20Council%20Opini
on%20on%20GLSLCI%20Request%20for%20Hearing%205-4-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CC6C-WLZT] (noting how the Compact Council addressed the 
merits “without fully resolving whether the Cities Initiative is a ‘Person aggrieved’ 
and thereby entitled to a hearing” and how it found that the Cities Initiative did not 
meet its burden to “warrant[] opening or modifying” the decision). 
 24. See Andrew Weiland, Great Lakes Cities Initiative Drops Challenge to 
Waukesha Water Diversion, MILWAUKEE BUS. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017, 4:27 PM), 
https://www.biztimes.com/2017/industries/energy-environment/great-lakes-cities-
initiative-drops-challenge-to-waukesha-water-diversion/ [https://perma.cc/25LP-
KV6Y] (“The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative announced Wednesday 
that it is settling its challenge to the city of Waukesha’s plans to tap Lake Michigan 
water.”). 
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Great Lakes Compact remains unresolved and subject to future 
debate.25 
This Comment seeks to explore the issue of standing under the 
Great Lakes Compact through challenges to the Waukesha 
Diversion.26 It highlights the public trust doctrine27 as an overarching 
principle that has been a cornerstone of Great Lakes management 
before looking in-depth at the Great Lakes Compact as a tool of 
interstate governance.28 It further examines the fundamentals of 
standing and specific interpretations of who can be classified as an 
aggrieved person,29 as well as the Waukesha Diversion’s approval 
and the Cities Initiative’s challenge.30 Ultimately, it argues that given 
the gravity of the decision, the value of the Great Lakes Basin and 
ecosystem, and the potential for long-term, irreversible ramifications, 
the Compact Council and reviewing courts should interpret the 
aggrieved person standard broadly in this context so as not to 
preclude and unduly limit review of the Waukesha Diversion 
approval.31 Furthermore, core principles emanating from the public 
trust doctrine should inform the standing analysis to best effectuate 
the Compact’s overall purpose—protecting the Great Lakes in 
perpetuity for generations to come.32 
Part I of this Comment provides background on Great Lakes 
governance, beginning with a brief overview of the public trust 
                                                 
 25. See Gary Wilson, Great Lakes Mayors Drop Legal Threat on Waukesha 
Diversion, GREAT LAKES NOW (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.greatlakesnow.org/ 
2017/08/great-lakes-mayors-drop-legal-threat-waukesha-diversion/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LBT7-AYM6] (noting how the decision to settle is “an action with long 
term implications”). 
 26. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, 
MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 35 (3d ed. 2010) (“Standing, broadly 
understood, is the authority of someone to initiate an action.”). 
 27. See Stephen E. Roady, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND 
COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 43 (Donald C. Baur et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015) (“The Public 
Trust Doctrine springs from ancient law concepts that treated certain lands and 
waters as belonging to the public for public benefit.”). 
 28. See generally infra Part I (describing the public trust doctrine and its 
recognition in the Great Lakes states and charting the history of Great Lakes 
governance leading up to the Great Lakes Compact). 
 29. See generally infra Part II (discussing the standing doctrine and 
highlighting cases interpreting the aggrieved person standard). 
 30. See generally infra Part III (examining the Waukesha Diversion 
Application, its approval, and the Cities Initiative’s challenge). 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Part IV; see also Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin 
Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 1.3(1)(f), 122 Stat. 3739, 3742-
43 (2008). 
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doctrine and its established presence in the Great Lakes states, 
followed by a discussion of some key historical developments in 
their management.33 It then shifts to specifically examine the Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, first 
providing an overview of interstate compacts as a mechanism for 
managing complex issues and then culminating in an in-depth look at 
the Compact, its purpose, and its pertinent provisions.34 Part II 
provides an overview of standing and the aggrieved person standard, 
focusing specifically on its interpretations as it relates to 
environmental issues.35 Part III delves into the Waukesha Diversion, 
including the underlying facts, and looks at the process from the 
plan’s inception to its approval.36 It also explores the arguments both 
opponents and proponents presented, including the governors’ 
rationales underlying their unanimous decision.37 Further, it 
documents the first challenge to the Waukesha Diversion brought 
forth by the Cities Initiative, focusing specifically on how the 
Compact Council expressly declined to rule on the issue of standing, 
therefore leaving the interpretation of the Compact’s “aggrieved 
person” provision unresolved.38 Finally, Part IV analyzes standing 
under the Great Lakes Compact and how both the Compact Council 
and reviewing courts should interpret the aggrieved person standard 
broadly in light of core public trust principles when considering the 
establishment of standing in challenges to the Waukesha Diversion.39 
I. GREAT LAKES GOVERNANCE: CONNECTING THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE, PAST MANAGEMENT ENDEAVORS, AND THE GREAT 
LAKES COMPACT 
It should come as no surprise that a colossal resource 
constituting one-fifth of the world’s water supply involves a highly 
complex system of governance.40 Moreover, because the Great Lakes 
incorporate international, national, local, and tribal stakeholders, they 
                                                 
 33. See infra Part I. 
 34. See infra Part I. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 723 (“The enormity of the Great 
Lakes is matched by a governance and legal regime that can overwhelm attorneys 
and policymakers.”). 
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necessitate intricate management.41 A brief overview of the public 
trust doctrine and its entrenchment in the eight Great Lakes states 
illustrates how its core principles have been a mainstay in the 
evolving governing framework.42 Furthermore, an examination of the 
key developments in Great Lakes governance demonstrates how the 
progressive management endeavors reflect the influence of public 
trust principles and the ever-increasing recognition of the waters’ 
value.43 Cognizant of this background, the ultimate proposal and 
ratification of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water 
Resources Compact signified a monumental effort to shift from a 
system of “patchwork”44 governance to one of legally enforceable 
interstate management.45 
A. The Public Doctrine: Anchoring Protection of Great Lakes Waters 
The public trust doctrine is an ancient principle that has been a 
fixture of American property law since this nation’s inception.46 At 
its core, the doctrine mandates that “public trust lands, waters and 
living resources in a State are held by the State in trust for the benefit 
of all [its] people, and establishes the right of the public to fully 
enjoy public trust lands, waters and living resources for a wide 
variety of recognized public uses.”47 Though the exact scope and 
                                                 
 41. See id. (“The system is shared and governed by two countries, eight 
states, two provinces, and numerous Indian tribes and First Nations, in addition to a 
multitude of American, Canadian, and international agencies, as well as thousands 
of local governments.”). 
 42. See discussion infra Section I.A (describing the public trust doctrine 
and its recognition in the Great Lakes states); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 151, 
164 (asserting that “virtually all eight Great Lakes states have adopted the public 
trust doctrine for the Great Lakes and navigable lakes and streams” and “[t]he 
principles of public trust have been historically recognized in Canada”).  
 43. See discussion infra Section I.B (charting the history of Great Lakes 
governance). 
 44. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 723-24 (“This ‘patchwork’ of 
Great Lakes governance has achieved mixed success, as the stressors affecting the 
Lakes have grown more pronounced.”). 
 45. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate 
Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 406 
(2006). The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact and 
its accompanying Agreement provide a new comprehensive mechanism with legal 
teeth to manage the Great Lakes. See id. 
 46. See Olson, supra note 2, at 145-47. 
 47. DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO 
WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LANDS, WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES 3 (1990). 
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application of the public trust doctrine varies from state to state, its 
underlying principles apply to the waters of the Great Lakes and 
have correspondingly influenced the history of their management.48 
1. The Origin of the Public Trust Doctrine and Its Basic 
Principles  
The origins of the public trust doctrine trace back to the Roman 
empire in the sixth century49 when the Institutes of Justinian, a 
codification of Roman civil law, formally acknowledged the public 
nature of certain natural resources and declared that “[b]y the law of 
nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”50 This landmark 
decree later influenced the developing law of Western Europe and 
especially took root in English common law, as it was explicitly 
adopted in the Magna Carta.51 The basic notion was that the crown 
held certain common resources, “like moving water,”52 in trust for 
                                                 
 48. See Olson, supra note 2, at 148 (“[W]hile the scope or standards of the 
public trust may vary from state to state, all recognize and follow [the] principle that 
protects the rights of the public to use navigable waters for navigation, boating, and 
fishing.”); see also id. at 150 (“[F]oundational principles of the doctrine are applied 
in most every state: the Great Lakes, and other navigable waters, are held in trust by 
the state for the benefit of the public.”). 
 49. See Roady, supra note 27, at 44. According to Roady, the Romans most 
likely adopted the public trust doctrine’s underlying principles from the ancient 
Greeks. Id. 
 50. Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes 
Shores, 58 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (citations omitted) (quoting 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 2.1.1, at 90 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 
1922)); see also SLADE ET AL., supra note 47, at 1 (“The Institutes of Justinian 
remain the touchstone of today’s Public Trust Doctrine.”).  
 51. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 47, at 5 (“Roman civil law eventually 
influenced the jurisprudence of all Western European nations.”); see also Kilbert, 
supra note 50, at 4 (“English common law similarly recognized the importance of 
maintaining navigable waters and the lands underlying them for common use. 
Control over navigable waters and the lands underlying them was considered an 
essential element of sovereignty, and therefore lands underlying navigable waters 
were owned by the crown in trust for use by the people.”); Olson, supra note 2, at 
146 (“This principle passed down into English common law through the Magna 
Carta.”). The underlying principles of the public trust doctrine also appeared in the 
writings of Henry de Bracton during the thirteenth century, which “reiterated the 
Justinian notion that certain resources were common to the public.” Roady, supra 
note 27, at 44.  
 52. See Olson, supra note 2, at 146 (“Common natural resources, like 
moving water, were understood to be held by government for the benefit of the 
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the benefit of the public and therefore had a corresponding duty as 
trustee to protect the public’s right to use these resources in 
perpetuity.53 Thus, this responsibility was one that could not be 
abdicated.54 
Through the colonization of North America, English common 
law public trust principles became a part of the governance 
framework of the thirteen original colonies55 and ultimately that of 
the United States.56 With the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the 
newly formed American government expanded the public trust 
doctrine’s scope to include fresh waters, explicitly holding that “the 
Mississippi and St. Lawrence Rivers [were] ‘common highways, and 
for ever free.’”57 Following this decree, the public trust doctrine 
                                                                                                       
people, imposing upon the government a responsibility to safeguard the public’s free 
use of these natural commons.”). 
 53. See id. at 146-47 (“Under English common law, the sea, the soil under 
the sea and over which the sea ebbed and flowed, and the seashore between the low 
and high water marks, was held by the Crown; but it was considered to be held in 
trust for the protection of the public’s uses of these waters and as common 
property.”). 
 54. See id. at 147 (“Neither the Crown nor private persons could interfere 
with or alienate the natural and fundamental right of the public to use navigable 
waters and their foreshore for public uses, including navigation, boating, or 
fishing.”); see also Kilbert, supra note 50, at 4 (“While legal title to the lands under 
navigable waters (jus privatum) could be transferred by the crown to a private party, 
the crown would continue to hold the public’s interest in using the lands (jus 
publicum) in trust for the people. Thus, notwithstanding private ownership of lands 
underlying navigable waters, the government retained its trust obligation, and the 
public would continue to have the rights to make use of navigable waters and 
underlying lands.”).  
 55. See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S COASTS 5 (1994). The first official recognition of the 
doctrine was in the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s Ordinances of 1641 and 1647, 
which “foreshadowed its thrust in American law over the following three centuries.” 
Id.; see also Roady, supra note 27, at 45 (“In broad terms, . . . the original colonies 
carried the basic elements of the Public Trust Doctrine concept forward when they 
established the United States.”). 
 56. See Kilbert, supra note 50, at 4 (“The United States inherited the public 
trust doctrine from English common law.”); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 147 
(“When the colonies won independence from England, ownership and control over 
navigable waters, shores, and common natural resources, like air and wildlife, vested 
in each of the sovereign states for the benefit of their citizens.”). 
 57. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 55, at 6 (quoting The Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787, 1 Stat. 50 (1789)). “A century and a half later, with the Northwest 
Ordinance, the newly formed United States government adopted public trust 
principles to apply to its great internal waterways.” Id. The Northwest Ordinance 
also established the Equal Footing Doctrine, which mandated that “each state has 
complete power over its public trust lands, subject only to the federal government’s 
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continued to develop in American jurisprudence through a series of 
Supreme Court cases, the “lodestar” being Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois, which expressly applied the doctrine to the Great 
Lakes.58 Though application of the doctrine has varied since the 
Court decided Illinois Central Railroad, the core principles it 
articulated remain unchanged, and the doctrine “has been recognized 
across the nation, including in all of the Great Lakes states.”59 
2. The Public Trust Doctrine in the Great Lakes States  
Each of the eight Great Lakes states—Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania—
have recognized the public trust doctrine and incorporated its core 
principles into their legal frameworks.60 Though their specific 
approaches vary in degree, they have signified a common 
commitment to protecting their navigable waters and public trust 
resources through a combination of constitutional provisions, 
statutory enactments, and state court decisions.61 Wisconsin’s public 
trust doctrine, for instance, “is ‘rooted in’” its constitutional 
provision that nearly mirrors the language of the Northwest 
                                                                                                       
supreme power under the United States Constitution’s commerce, navigation, and 
treaty powers.” Id. at 9. 
 58. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37, 459 (1892); see 
also Kilbert, supra note 50, at 5 (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois is often referred to as the ‘lodestar’ of American 
public trust law.”); Olson, supra note 2, at 148 (“In the seminal case of Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
foundational nature of the public trust doctrine and its applicability to the Great 
Lakes and navigable waters.”).  
 59. Kilbert, supra note 50, at 5-6 (“[A]t its core, the public trust doctrine 
teaches that each state holds the navigable waters and lands underlying them in trust 
for use by the public for certain protected uses, traditionally navigation, fishing, and 
commerce. Not only does the public trust doctrine afford certain rights to the public, 
it imposes certain responsibilities on the state to protect the public’s rights to use 
those waters and underlying lands. The public trust doctrine can be employed to 
invalidate or stop both governmental and private actions that violate the doctrine.”); 
see also Olson, supra note 2, at 151 (“These principles have remained constant and 
flourished over time in the states, including all of the Great Lakes states.”). 
 60. See Olson, supra note 2, at 151. 
 61. See id. at 151-52 (“The constitutions or laws of several of the states 
have recognized a public trust in navigable waters or public natural resources.”); see 
also id. at 152-64 (summarizing “each of the Great Lakes states’ statutory, 
constitutional, and/or jurisprudential recognition of the public trust doctrine”). 
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Ordinance.62 The Wisconsin legislature has also enacted several 
statutes that expressly dictate the doctrine’s scope and application, 
and its contours have developed through state court decisions.63 
Similarly, Michigan’s public trust doctrine is implicitly recognized in 
its Constitution, and statutes, such as its Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act, directly assert that the state has an 
obligation to protect the integrity of its waters for future 
generations.64 The state’s highest court has also repeatedly affirmed 
the state’s public trust duty.65 Like in Wisconsin, Minnesota’s 
Constitution declares that its navigable waters “shall be . . . forever 
free to citizens,” and its legislature has enacted several statutes that 
empower the public trust doctrine.66 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has also directly held that the state’s public trust principles 
encompass Lake Superior.67  
Ohio’s judicial system has likewise emphasized its recognition 
of the public trust doctrine and its particular applicability to Lake 
Erie, as has the state legislature in its Coastal Management statute.68 
                                                 
 62. Id. at 162 (quoting Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of 
Nat. Res., 717 N.W.2d 166, 173 (Wis. 2006)); see also WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 63. See Olson, supra note 2, at 164 (“The state also has a number of 
statutory provisions recognizing the importance of the public trust doctrine, and 
governing its application with respect to public trust resources in Wisconsin.”); see 
also id. at 163 (“The courts have developed a number of core public trust 
standards.”). 
 64. See id. at 155; see also MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52 (“The conservation 
and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of 
paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of 
the people.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32702(1)(c) (1994) (“The waters of the 
state are valuable public natural resources held in trust by the state, and the state has 
a duty as trustee to manage its waters effectively for the use and enjoyment of 
present and future residents and for the protection of the environment.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Obrecht v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Mich. 
1960) (“This Court, equally with the legislative and executive departments, is one of 
the sworn guardians of Michigan’s duty and responsibility as trustee of the . . . five 
Great Lakes.”); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 156-57 (discussing Michigan case 
law). 
 66. MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Olson, supra note 2, at 158 
(“Minnesota declares that its air, water, and natural resources and ‘the public trust’ 
in those resources are protected from ‘pollution, impairment or destruction.’”) 
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 116.B.03 (2009)). 
 67. See Olson, supra note 2, at 157 (“The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
recognized the public trust doctrine in its navigable waters, including Lake 
Superior.”) (citing Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942)). 
 68. See id. at 160 (quoting Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1979)); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 1989) (“It is 
hereby declared that the waters of Lake Erie consisting of the territory within the 
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In Indiana, state courts have expressly held that the public trust 
doctrine applies to Lake Michigan,69 and its legislature has also 
codified the doctrine and its core principles into law, declaring that 
the public has “a vested right” in protecting the integrity of the 
freshwater lakes within the state’s borders.70 Comparably, various 
New York statutes and state court decisions also recognize public 
trust principles and enshrine its citizens’ rights under them.71 Finally, 
Illinois and Pennsylvania each have express provisions in their 
constitutions establishing the public trust doctrine’s presence in their 
governing frameworks,72 and their legislatures have enacted statutes 
to execute its principles.73 Given the entrenchment of the public trust 
doctrine in each of the Great Lakes states, it is unsurprising that 
elemental facts of the doctrine have played a role in Great Lakes 
management endeavors.74 
B. Great Lakes Governance: An Evolving Path of Progress 
The Great Lakes are a prized treasure, and the history of 
progressive management efforts leading up to the ratification of the 
                                                                                                       
boundaries of the state . . . together with the soil beneath and their contents, do now 
belong and have always, since the organization of the state of Ohio, belonged to the 
state as proprietor in trust for the people of the state.”). “Ohio has no constitutional 
public trust declaration . . . .” Olson, supra note 2, at 160. 
 69. See Olson, supra note 2, at 153-54. 
 70. IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(c) (2003). See Olson, supra note 2, at 154 (“In 
1955 the Indiana Legislature adopted the public trust into law, stating that the waters 
‘in a natural stream, natural lake, or other natural body of water in Indiana that may 
be applied to a useful or beneficial purpose is declared to be a natural resource and 
public water of Indiana.’”) (quoting IND. CODE § 14-25-1(2) (1995)). 
 71. See Adirondack League Club Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 
792 (1994) (illustrating an application of public trust principles); Olson, supra note 
2, at 159 n.107 (listing other references to the public trust doctrine in New York 
law). 
 72. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The public policy of the State and the duty 
of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of 
this and future generations.”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to 
clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and 
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of 
these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit 
of all the people.”). 
 73. See Olson, supra note 2, at 153 n.66-67 (listing the several Illinois 
statutes, including ones that regulate the Great Lakes); see also id. at 161 (noting 
that because Pennsylvania’s public trust declaration in its Constitution is not “self-
executing,” the state legislature has implemented laws to implement it). 
 74. See id. at 151. 
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Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 
reflects this notion.75 Thus, addressing the key developments in Great 
Lakes management fosters understanding and corresponding 
appreciation for the current state and complexity characterizing their 
governance framework.76 The pivotal developments in the evolution 
of this body of law include the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the 
Great Lakes Charter of 1985, the Water Resources Development Act 
of 1986, and the Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001.77 When 
enacted, each of these advancements constituted a deliberate step 
forward to improve Great Lakes protection.78 
1. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 
The Boundary Waters Treaty signified the start of formal 
efforts to protect the Great Lakes.79 Signed by both the Unites States 
and Canada, it created the International Joint Commission to help 
manage activities that might impact the waters lying between the two 
nations’ borders.80 While it did establish a general prohibition on 
water diversions from the Great Lakes, the ban ultimately only 
extended to surface waters.81 Thus, requests for diversions could be 
approved only if they did not “affect[] the ‘natural flow or level’ of 
the lake on the other side of the boundary.”82 Another significant 
                                                 
 75. See Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts: 
A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 174-75 (2007) (“The 
American and Canadian governments have recognized the value and importance of 
the Great Lakes and have been working together for years in an effort to protect this 
multi-jurisdictional, complex resource.”). 
 76. See id. at 176 (“Similar to the Great Lakes ecosystem, the layers and 
levels of political and legal institutions overlying the natural basin are complex and 
diverse. Two federal governments, eight states, two provinces, and a list of 
American, Canadian and international agencies operate within the Basin. In 
addition, there are millions of private actors including industry representatives, 
environmentalists and residents. The difficulty in establishing an effective, basin-
wide water quantity management system is coordinating all these stakeholders.”). 
 77. See infra Subsections I.B.1-4. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Bielecki, supra note 75, at 177; see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 
748 (2007) (“The Boundary Waters Treaty . . . is the beginning of what might be 
called the ‘law of the lakes.’”). 
 80. See Dellapenna, supra note 79, at 748. 
 81. See Olson, supra note 6, at 35. 
 82. Melissa K. Scanlan, Jodi H. Sinykin & James Krohelski, Realizing the 
Promise of the Great Lakes Compact: A Policy Analysis for State Implementation, 8 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 50 (2006); see also Treaty Between the United States and Great 
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shortcoming of this Treaty was that it did not encompass Lake 
Michigan or its connecting lakes and tributaries.83 
The lengthy battle between Illinois and the other Great Lakes 
states illustrates this particular flaw.84 Beginning at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the City of Chicago experienced a population 
boom that corresponded with a heightened demand for fresh water 
from Lake Michigan.85 To quench its citizens’ thirst, Chicago 
increased the amount of diverted lake water between 1900 and 1924 
from 2,541 cubic feet per second to 8,500 cubic feet per second.86 
Such a drastic increase had cognizable effects on Lake Michigan’s 
water levels, leading Wisconsin, Michigan, and New York to file suit 
against Illinois in the United States Supreme Court.87 Among their 
various claims, the states alleged that Lake Michigan’s water levels 
had decreased by over six inches due to the Chicago Diversion.88 In 
response, Illinois argued chiefly that the diversion was a public 
health necessity and that it had not caused any actual injury.89 
Ultimately siding with the plaintiff states, the Supreme Court 
found that the Chicago Diversion not only lowered Lake Michigan’s 
and Huron’s water levels by over six inches, but it also lowered Lake 
Erie’s and Ontario’s water levels by five inches.90 Thus, the Court 
concluded that the Great Lakes states were indeed injured by the 
Chicago Diversion.91 Nevertheless, the Court did acknowledge 
Illinois’s public health concerns, so rather than outright banning the 
                                                                                                       
Britain Relating to Border Waters Between the United States and Canada, art. III, 
Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
 83. See Olson, supra note 6, at 35. 
 84. See generally Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin VI), 449 U.S. 48 (1980); 
Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin V), 388 U.S. 426 (1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois 
(Wisconsin IV), 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin III), 281 U.S. 
696 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin II), 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. 
Illinois (Wisconsin I), 278 U.S. 367 (1929). 
 85. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 752. 
 86. See id. at 754-55. 
 87. See id. at 755 (noting that after the initial suit by Wisconsin, Michigan, 
and New York, almost every other Great Lakes state joined the cause). 
 88. See id. The states also argued that the diversion was impairing 
navigation and injuring citizens and property. Id. 
 89. See Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 410. 
 90. See id. at 407. 
 91. See id. at 408 (recognizing that the diversion resulted in injury “to 
navigation and commercial interests, to structures, to the convenience of summer 
resorts, to fishing and hunting grounds, to public parks and other enterprises, and to 
riparian property generally”). 
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practice, it ordered a “phased reduction.”92 As a whole, the landmark 
saga over the Chicago River Diversion demonstrates the impact of 
the Boundary Waters Treaty’s failure to incorporate Lake Michigan 
into its framework.93 At that time, it also signified the need for 
improved forms of governance to achieve the original goal of Great 
Lakes protection.94 
2. The Great Lakes Charter of 1985 
Because of the Boundary Waters Treaty’s failure to protect 
groundwater and incorporate Lake Michigan into its framework, the 
eight governors of the Great Lakes states and the two premiers of 
Ontario and Quebec signed the Great Lakes Charter of 1985.95 This 
nonbinding agreement professed that “the water resources of the 
Great Lakes Basin are precious public resources, shared and held in 
trust.”96 Notably, it also acknowledged that the waters within the 
Great Lakes are part of one unified system.97 While the Great Lakes 
Charter did recognize the harmful impact diversions could have on 
the lakes and established impressive goals to prevent them,98 a lack 
of political will and enforcement mechanisms prevented the Charter 
from living up to its potential.99 As a result, the Great Lakes Charter 
of 1985 did not adequately fulfill Great Lakes governance need, 
                                                 
 92. Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 756. After almost a century of 
litigation, the Chicago diversion is currently capped at 3,200 cubic feet per second. 
Id. 
 93. See Olson, supra note 6, at 35. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 51; see also 
GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE 
WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 33-34 (2000) (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), was 
also an impetus for creating the Great Lakes Charter). 
 96. The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for Management of Great Lakes 
Water Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, http://www.gsgp.org/projects/water/docs/ 
GreatLakesCharter.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8BJ-44L3]. For additional reference, see 
James M. Olson, Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Public Trust, and 
International Trade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1121. 
 97. See Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 51. The Great 
Lakes Charter acknowledged that the Great Lakes Basin waters are all 
“interconnected and part of a single hydrologic system.” Id. 
 98. See id. at 52. 
 99. See id. 
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illustrating the necessity for new legislation—the Water Resources 
Development Act.100 
3. Water Resources Development Act of 1986 
After the creation of the Great Lakes Charter, Congress 
explicitly recognized the harmful impact that water diversions would 
have on the Great Lakes and its tributaries, so it enacted the Water 
Resources Development Act (WRDA).101 The WRDA expressly bans 
out-of-basin diversions and exports from the Great Lakes unless 
approved by the unanimous consent of all eight governors of the 
Great Lakes states—Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, 
Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York.102 Unlike the Great Lakes 
Charter, which only required approval for diversions exceeding five 
or more million gallons per day, the WRDA included no such 
limitation and required approval for all out-of-basin diversions, no 
matter how small.103 Additionally, because the WRDA was an act of 
Congress, it was legally enforceable, giving it more power than the 
1985 Charter.104 However, while the WRDA was a seemingly 
powerful piece of legislation needed to protect the Great Lakes, it did 
not outline any decision-making standards to guide the evaluation of 
potential diversion requests.105 
                                                 
 100. See id. at 53 (“Hence, the Great Lakes Charter fails to require adequate 
regulations governing shared access and use of the trust property.”). 
 101. See Olson, supra note 96, at 1121 (“Recognizing that diversions of 
water from the Great Lakes and tributary waters would adversely impact domestic, 
industrial, and navigational uses in the Basin as well as the environment, Congress 
passed [the Water Resources and Development Act].”). 
 102. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 
1109(d), 100 Stat. 4082, 4231 (1986) (“No water shall be diverted from any portion 
of the Great Lakes within the United States, or from any tributary within the United 
States of any of the Great Lakes, for use outside the Great Lakes basin unless such 
diversion is approved by the Governor of each of the Great Lakes States.”). 
 103. See Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 54 (explaining the 
differences between the Great Lakes Charter and the WRDA). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 56; see also Bielecki, supra note 75, at 181 (stating that the 
lack of decision-making standards made the WRDA “vulnerable to legal 
challenges”). 
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4. The Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001 
Due to heightened pressures on the Great Lakes Basin and its 
ecosystem,106 the eight governors of the Great Lakes states and the 
two premiers of Ontario and Quebec reconvened to draft and enact a 
supplement to the Great Lakes Charter of 1985.107 Unlike the Charter, 
the Annex was both binding and legally enforceable, as it required 
all the provinces and states to come to a formal and legally binding 
agreement and enact corresponding legislation within three years.108 
It also established decision-making standards.109 For instance, when 
faced with requests for new or increased withdrawals, the Annex 
asserted that the governors should make their decision with the 
overarching goal of preventing or mitigating any permanent water 
loss from the Great Lakes Basin.110 To accomplish this objective, 
requesting parties would be required to return the amount of water 
withdrawn and additionally impose conservation measures.111 
Likewise, any new or increased withdrawals could neither impair 
Great Lakes water quality or quantity, nor be a detriment to water-
dependent resources.112 Further, the Annex required parties seeking 
new or increased withdrawals to improve water quality and any 
water-dependent resources.113 Finally, the new or increased diversion 
had to comport with the “applicable laws and treaties.”114 Notably, 
the Annex maintained the existing ban on diversions under the 
WRDA in the absence of all eight Great Lakes governors’ consent.115 
Thus, as a whole, the Annex served as the final step in the Great 
                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Bridget Donegan, Comment, The Great Lakes Compact and 
the Public Trust Doctrine: Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455, 456 (2009). A major impetus inducing the drafting and 
creation of the Annex occurred in 1998 when a company in Ontario sought to ship 
tankers of Lake Superior water to Asia. See id. 
 107. See Olson, supra note 6, at 35 (“Because of the increased pressures on 
the Great Lakes since 1985, the premiers and governors in late 2000 released Annex 
2001 to supplement the Great Lakes Charter in an effort to promote fundamental 
principles of cooperation and to protect, conserve, and improve the waters.”). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Bielecki, supra note 75, at 181-82; see also Scanlan, Sinykin & 
Krohelski, supra note 82, at 56. 
 110. See Scanlan, Sinykin, & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 56-57. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 56-57. 
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Lakes governance bridge from the Boundary Waters Treaty to the 
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact.116 
C. The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact 
The monumental decision to enter into the Great Lakes 
Compact117 and its companion Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (Agreement)118 
signified the culmination of a century’s worth of collaborative efforts 
to protect the integrity and vitality of the Great Lakes.119 On 
December 13, 2005, all eight governors of the Great Lakes states and 
the two Canadian provinces signed these “historic agreement[s],” 
which once again recognized the need for basin-wide management.120 
However, to be fully effective and have the force of law, each of the 
eight states had to ratify the Compact and Congress had to give its 
consent.121 This event ultimately occurred on October 3, 2008, and 
the comprehensive framework intended to protect the Great Lakes 
Basin in the most sustainable way became binding law.122 Due to the 
Compact’s landmark nature, some basic background on interstate 
                                                 
 116. See Bielecki, supra note 75, at 183 (noting that the Annex “set the 
stage” for both the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact and the accompanying Sustainable Water Resources Agreement). 
 117. See generally Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 
No. 110–342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008). 
 118. See generally THE GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 




 119. See supra Section I.A (outlining the evolving steps taken to protect the 
Great Lakes); see also § 1.3(2)(b), (f), 122 Stat. 3743 (describing the purposes of the 
Compact, including “remov[ing] causes of present and future controversies” and 
“prevent[ing] significant adverse impacts of Withdrawals and losses on the Basin’s 
ecosystems and watersheds”). 
 120. See Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 57; see also § 
1.3(1)(b), 122 Stat. 3742 (“The Waters of the Basin are interconnected and part of a 
single hydrologic system.”). 
 121. See Donegan, supra note 106, at 462 (noting that before the Compact 
could become a federally approved law, each signatory had to pass state legislation 
ratifying it); see also Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 57 (“Prior to 
the Compact becoming effective and enforceable, each Great Lakes state must pass 
legislation adopting the Compact, and then Congress must give its consent.”). 
 122. See Donegan, supra note 106, at 462. 
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compacts promotes a deeper appreciation for the significance and 
power it wields.123 
1. Interstate Compacts: A Brief Overview 
Interstate compacts are a dynamic and efficient mechanism for 
managing complex issues, and they have been a key feature of 
American government since the colonial era.124 They are both 
contractual and statutory in nature and allow states “to create sub-
federal, supra-state administrative agencies: a third tier of governing 
authority created by the collective action of the member states but 
not subject to the single authority of any one state.”125 Interstate 
compacts are efficient because they allow states to address unique 
social, political, economic, and environmental issues that are not 
necessarily suitable for strictly national governance or control by a 
single state.126 Moreover, they allow for adaptive governance because 
they enable states to create malleable policies that can mold to fit 
evolving challenges.127 Environmental and natural resource interstate 
compacts are especially valuable for their flexibility,128 and states 
                                                 
 123. See infra Subsection I.B.1 (providing some succinct and pertinent 
information pertaining to interstate compacts). 
 124. See CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1 (2006) (“The Framers 
of the Constitution understood that the federal structure of American government 
required formal mechanisms for managing interstate relations, and particularly for 
managing the complex government, political and economic allegiances that states 
might form between themselves.”); see also id. at 3 (“Compacts are . . . the oldest 
mechanism available to promote formal interstate cooperation, having their roots in 
the American colonial era.”); id. at 178 (“[T]oday there are more than 200 interstate 
compacts on the books.”). 
 125. Id. at 11; see also Daniel E. Andersen, Note, Straddling the Federal-
State Divide: Federal Court Review of Interstate Agency Actions, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1601, 1621-22 (2016) (“[I]nterstate agencies may take many forms, [but] they 
usually function to accomplish multi-state objectives, coordinate interstate efforts to 
solve wide-reaching problems, oversee complex transactions, and conserve 
resources.”). 
 126. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 124, at 21 (“[I]nterstate compacts 
represent a political compromise between constituent elements of the Union. Such 
agreements are made to address interests and problems that do not coincide easily 
with the national boundaries or state lines—interests that may be badly served or not 
served at all by the ordinary channels of national or state political action.”). 
 127. See id. at 27 (“Compacts . . . enable the states to develop adaptive 
structures that can evolve to meet new and increased challenges that naturally arise 
over time.”); see, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (noting how 
flexible compacts were used as a tool to address both present and future issues). 
 128. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 124, at 261. 
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have commonly utilized them for allocating water, controlling 
pollution, planning and flood control, and other regulatory 
purposes.129 Consequently, because of the multitude of threats 
constantly facing the Great Lakes, it is unsurprising that the eight 
governors of the Great Lakes states elected to create an interstate 
compact subsequent to the Annex of 2001 as a means of ensuring 
that the waters and their tributaries are protected in perpetuity.130 
2. The Great Lakes Compact: Pertinent Provisions 
As a federally recognized and enforceable law, the Great Lakes 
Compact explicitly recognizes that both the surface and groundwater 
within the Great Lakes Basin are treasures to be forever held in trust 
by the Great Lakes states.131 An elementary finding of the Compact 
emanating from this principle is that future diversions have the 
potential to be catastrophic to the Basin as a whole.132 Consequently, 
to protect the entire Great Lakes Basin, the Compact virtually 
outlaws any new or increased diversions.133 There are only three 
permissible exceptions to this blanket prohibition, making the quest 
for Great Lakes water a difficult feat.134 These exceptions include the 
                                                 
 129. See id. at 263-64 (“[I]nterstate compacts are a common method [of] 
allocat[ing] water between and among states bordering on water supplies including 
rivers, lakes, and bays.”); see also SHERK, supra note 95, at 30-36. 
 130. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 124, at 278 (“Allocation of water from 
the Great Lakes has historically presented national and international issues.”). 
 131. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 1.3(1)(a), 122 Stat. 3739, 3742 (2008) (“The Waters of the 
Basin are precious public natural resources shared and held in trust by the States.”); 
see also id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3742 (defining “[w]ater” as “ground or surface water 
contained within the Basin”). 
 132. See id. § 1.3(1)(d), 122 Stat. at 3742 (“Future Diversions . . . of Basin 
Water resources have the potential to significantly impact the environment, 
economy[,] and welfare of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River region.”). 
 133. See id. § 4.8, 122 Stat. at 3752 (“All New or Increased Diversions are 
prohibited, except as provided for in this Article.”); see also id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 
3740 (“Diversion means a transfer of Water from the Basin into another watershed, 
or from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into that of another by any means of 
transfer, including but not limited to a pipeline, canal, tunnel, aqueduct, channel, 
modification of the direction of a water course, a tanker ship, tanker truck or rail 
tanker but does not apply to Water that is used in the Basin or a Great Lake 
watershed to manufacture or produce a Product that is then transferred out of the 
Basin or watershed. Divert has a corresponding meaning.”). 
 134. See id. § 4.9(1)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3752-54; see also id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 
3742 (“Straddling Community means any incorporated city, town or the equivalent 
thereof, wholly within any County that lies partly or completely within the Basin, 
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Straddling Communities Exception,135 the Intra-Basin Transfer 
Exception,136 and the Straddling Counties Exception.137 To meet the 
threshold and satisfy one of these exceptions, not only must a 
petitioning party’s proposal be unanimously approved, but it must 
also fulfill certain requirements outlined in the Compact’s Exception 
Standards.138 These standards include establishing that “[t]he need 
for . . . the proposed [e]xception cannot be reasonably avoided”; that 
the amount needed under the exception is reasonable to achieve its 
purpose; that all the water taken under the exception will be returned 
                                                                                                       
whose corporate boundary existing as of the effective date of this Compact, is partly 
within the Basin or partly within two Great Lakes watersheds.”); id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. 
at 3741 (“Intra-Basin Transfer means the transfer of Water from the watershed of 
one of the Great Lakes into the watershed of another Great Lake.”); id. § 1.2, 122 
Stat. at 3740 (“Community within a Straddling County means any incorporated city, 
town or the equivalent thereof, that is located outside the Basin but wholly within a 
County that lies partly within the Basin and that is not a Straddling Community.”). 
 135. See id. § 4.9(1), 122 Stat. at 3752 (“A Proposal to transfer Water to an 
area within a Straddling Community but outside the Basin or outside the source 
Great Lake Watershed shall be excepted from the prohibition against Diversions and 
be managed and regulated by the Originating Party provided that . . . [certain 
conditions be met.]”). 
 136. See id. § 4.9(2), 122 Stat. at 3753 (“A Proposal for an Intra-Basin 
Transfer that would be considered a Diversion under this Compact, and not already 
excepted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, shall be excepted from the 
prohibition against Diversions, provided that . . . [certain conditions be met.]”). 
 137. See id. § 4.9(3), 122 Stat. at 3753-54 (“A Proposal to transfer Water to a 
Community within a Straddling County that would be considered a Diversion under 
this Compact shall be excepted from the prohibition against Diversions, provided 
that it satisfies all of the following conditions: (a) The Water shall be used solely for 
the Public Water Supply Purposes of the Community within a Straddling County 
that is without adequate supplies of potable water; (b) The Proposal meets the 
Exception Standard, maximizing the portion of water returned to the Source 
Watershed as Basin Water and minimizing the surface water or groundwater from 
outside the Basin; (c) The Proposal shall be subject to management and regulation 
by the Originating Party, regardless of its size; (d) There is no reasonable water 
supply alternative within the basin in which the community is located, including 
conservation of existing water supplies; (e) Caution shall be used in determining 
whether or not the Proposal meets the conditions for this Exception. This Exception 
should not be authorized unless it can be shown that it will not endanger the 
integrity of the Basin Ecosystem; (f) The Proposal undergoes Regional Review; and, 
(g) The Proposal is approved by the Council. Council approval shall be given unless 
one or more Council Members vote to disapprove. A Proposal must satisfy all of the 
conditions listed above. Further, substantive consideration will also be given to 
whether or not the Proposal can provide sufficient scientifically based evidence that 
the existing water supply is derived from groundwater that is hydrologically 
interconnected to the Waters of the Basin.”). 
 138. See id. § 4.9(4), 122 Stat. at 3754. 
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to the source watershed; that there will be “no significant individual 
or cumulative adverse impacts” on the entire Basin; that the party 
will implement conservation measures along with the exception; and 
that the exception will also comply with other applicable laws, 
including the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.139 
The Great Lakes Compact provides for dispute resolution 
procedures in the event that any person140 disagrees with a decision 
the governors make.141 For instance, if all eight governors 
unanimously decide that an application satisfies the exception 
standards and elect to approve an otherwise prohibited diversion, 
“[a]ny [p]erson aggrieved” by such action can request to have a 
hearing before the Compact Council.142 Upon exhaustion of all 
administrative remedies, the aggrieved person expressly retains a 
                                                 
 139. Id. (“Proposals subject to management and regulation in this Section 
shall be declared to meet this Exception Standard and may be approved as 
appropriate only when the following criteria are met: (a) The need for all or part of 
the proposed Exception cannot be reasonably avoided through the efficient use and 
conservation of existing water supplies; (b) The Exception will be limited to 
quantities that are considered reasonable for the purposes for which it is proposed; 
(c) All Water Withdrawn shall be returned, either naturally or after use, to the 
Source Watershed less an allowance for Consumptive Use. No surface water or 
groundwater from the outside the Basin may be used to satisfy any portion of this 
criterion except if it: (i) Is part of a water supply or wastewater treatment system that 
combines water from inside and outside of the Basin; (ii) Is treated to meet 
applicable water quality discharge standards and to prevent the introduction of 
invasive species into the Basin; (d) The Exception will be implemented so as to 
ensure that it will result in no significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to 
the quantity or quality of the Waters and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the 
Basin with consideration given to the potential Cumulative Impacts of any 
precedent-setting consequences associated with the Proposal; (e) The Exception will 
be implemented so as to incorporate Environmentally Sound and Economically 
Feasible Water Conservation Measures to minimize Water Withdrawals or 
Consumptive Use; (f) The Exception will be implemented so as to ensure that it is in 
compliance with all applicable municipal, State and federal laws as well as regional 
interstate and international agreements, including the Boundary Waters Treaty of 
1909; and, (g) All other applicable criteria in Section 4.9 have also been met.”). 
 140. See id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3741 (defining “[p]erson” as “a human being 
or a legal person, including a government or a nongovernmental organization, 
including any scientific, professional, business, non-profit, or public interest 
organization or association that is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of a 
government”). 
 141. See id. § 7.3, 122 Stat. at 3761. 
 142. Id. § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761 (“Any Person aggrieved by any action 
taken by the Council pursuant to the authorities contained in this Compact shall be 
entitled to a hearing before the Council.”); see also id. § 2.2, 122 Stat. at 3744 
(noting that “[t]he Council” consists of the governors of the eight Great Lakes 
states). 
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right of judicial review concerning the Council’s action.143 This 
review can occur in either the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia or the federal district court where the Compact 
Council has its offices.144 Notably, the Compact does not explicitly 
define who qualifies as an “aggrieved person,” therefore leaving the 
question open to interpretation when challenges arise.145 
Because the public trust doctrine is so entrenched in the Great 
Lakes states, its principles have influenced management efforts to 
protect the waters in perpetuity.146 Moreover, the evolution of Great 
Lakes governance from the Boundary Waters Treaty to the 
comprehensive Great Lakes Compact corresponded with heightened 
awareness of the need to protect the Great Lakes from systemic 
threats.147 One threat that has always been on the conscience of those 
entrusted with protecting the lakes is the diversion of water from the 
Great Lakes Basin.148 As the current management framework, the 
Compact expressly reflects this concern in its general ban against the 
practice and in its limited exceptions provisions.149 Given the delicate 
nature of this precious, unrivaled resource and the potential gravity 
                                                 
 143. See id. § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761. 
 144. See id. (noting that the action seeking judicial review must occur within 
ninety days); see also Contact Information, GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 
BASIN WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, http://www.glslcompactcouncil.org/ 
Contact.aspx [https://perma.cc/W6BH-SE63] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (noting that 
the Council is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois). 
 145. See § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761; see also id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3739-42 
(illustrating that “aggrieved” does not appear in the Compact’s definition section). 
 146. See Olson, supra note 2, at 396 (“[R]ights of public use or public trust 
in Great Lakes and navigable waters . . . [are] deeply anchored in the common law 
and sovereignty of both countries, the states, and provinces.”). 
 147. See Bielecki, supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 50 (asserting 
that the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 recognized that diversions could 
negatively alter water levels and flows); see also § 1.3(1)(d), 122 Stat. at 3742 
(declaring that “[f]uture [d]iversions and [c]onsumptive [u]ses of Basin [w]ater 
resources have the potential to significantly impact the environment, economy and 
welfare of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River region”); Olson, supra note 96, at 
1121 (discussing how the Water Resources Development Act expressly banned out-
of-basin diversions because Congress recognized the detrimental impact they could 
have not only on the environment, but also on the domestic, industrial, and 
navigational uses occurring within the Great Lakes Basin); Scanlan, Sinykin & 
Krohelski, supra note 82, at 51 (noting how the signatories of the 1985 Great Lakes 
Charter set forth goals to mitigate the adverse effects diversions posed). 
 149. See §§ 4.8, 4.9(1)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3752-54. 
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decisions impacting it could have, the Compact enables aggrieved 
persons to challenge the Council’s actions as a safeguard.150 
II. STANDING: ARE YOU “AGGRIEVED”? 
As a resource spanning a surface area of more than 300,000 
square miles that provides drinking water for over twenty-three 
million people,151 the Great Lakes push the traditional boundaries of 
standing.152 Standing is a foundational prerequisite necessary to bring 
a cause of action, and its elements on the most general level include 
injury, causation, and redressability.153 The legislature can further 
circumscribe the standing threshold in a statute; under the Great 
Lakes Compact, “[a]ny [p]erson aggrieved” by Compact Council 
action can potentially meet it.154 However, cases arising under the 
Great Lakes Compact challenging Compact Council action merit 
special attention since the document fails to define what classifies a 
person as aggrieved in its definition section and in its dispute 
resolution provision.155 Thus, this question of interpretation is of 
particular importance since the magnitude of the Great Lakes as a 
resource uniquely complicates traditional standing perceptions.156 
                                                 
 150. See id. § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761. 
 151. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 723 (“Approximately 35 million 
people live within the Great Lakes Basin, and 23 million depend on the Lakes for 
their drinking water. The Lakes are more than 750 miles wide and have a surface 
area greater than 300,000 square miles; there are 25,000 square miles of connected 
smaller lakes, hundreds of miles of navigable rivers, and 10,000 miles of 
shoreline.”). 
 152. See STONE, supra note 26, at 35 (“Standing, broadly understood, is the 
authority of someone to initiate an action. The term in its narrower common use is 
probably limited to the right of nongovernmental parties to institute judicial 
review.”). 
 153. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also 
infra Section II.A (discussing the elements of standing in further detail). 
 154. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 122 
Stat. 3761 § 7.3(1). 
 155. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 156. See generally STONE, supra note 26, at 35; see also Hall & Houston, 
supra note 5, at 723 (highlighting the magnitude of the Great Lakes as a shared, 
interconnected resource). 
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A. Standing Overview 
Standing is a justiciability filter that determines whether a party 
can challenge a particular issue or decision.157 While the term itself 
does not appear in the Constitution,158 it is nonetheless a doctrine 
with constitutional roots based on the “‘case’ or ‘controversy’” 
requirement expressed in Article III.159 However, despite this origin, 
the particular standing elements do not come from the Constitution, 
but are rather the product of evolving common law and state codes.160 
While their application is context dependent,161 there are three 
traditionally recognized elements that a challenging party must 
satisfy.162 The first requirement is that the party must have suffered a 
concrete and particularized “injury in fact” that is “actual or 
imminent” instead of “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”163 This element 
has been the subject of much contest, as there is debate over what 
can constitute a “legally cognizable injury.”164 The second 
                                                 
 157. See STONE, supra note 26, at 35 (“Standing is only one of a number of 
justiciability issues that a party has to satisfy to get through the courthouse door.”); 
see also id. (asserting that “to achieve standing does not imply winning”). 
 158. See id. (“The term ‘standing’ makes no appearance in the 
Constitution.”). 
 159. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and 
Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of 
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, 
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”). 
 160. See STONE, supra note 26, at 36; see also Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965) (“Although a ‘case’ or 
‘controversy’ which is otherwise lacking cannot be created by statute, a statute may 
create new interests or rights and thus give standing to one who would otherwise be 
barred by the lack of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”). 
 161. See STONE, supra note 26, at 49 (“The standards for standing are not the 
same in each setting.”). 
 162. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Over the 
years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing contains three elements.”). 
 163. Id. (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 164. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource 
Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 140 
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prerequisite is more straightforward, requiring that the defendant’s 
conduct in the case be causally connected or “fairly . . . trace[able]” 
to the complainant’s alleged injury.165 Finally, the third element of 
standing demands that the challenging party demonstrate 
redressability, namely that a favorable outcome in the case is likely 
to adequately remedy the injury claimed.166 
One particular facet of standing worth noting involves a party’s 
allegation that procedural error has occurred resulting in injury to a 
concrete interest.167 For a party to claim procedural injury, the 
defendant, typically a governmental agency, must have failed to 
comply with a statutorily-mandated procedural requirement that 
exists to protect that concrete interest.168 To achieve standing with a 
procedural rights claim, the critical point is that the challenging party 
does not have to satisfy the elements of causation and 
                                                                                                       
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010) (stating that “[i]n 1972, the 
Court recognized non-economic aesthetic and environmental interests as legally 
cognizable ‘injuries’ that can serve as a sufficient basis for constitutional standing 
under Article III”) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). May pointed 
out that this is in contrast with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, Inc., which clarified that “it is injury to a person, and not the environment, 
that matters, thus obviating any need to show environmental degradation to support 
constitutional injury.” Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)). 
 165. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (“Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’”) 
(quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 
 166. See id. at 561 (“Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”) (quoting 
Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 562. The challengers in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
claimed that they suffered a procedural injury based on the Secretary of the 
Interior’s failure to follow the consultation requirement of the Endangered Species 
Act. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, 122 Stat. 3739, 3760, § 6.1(1) (2008) (“The Parties 
recognize the importance and necessity of public participation in promoting 
management of the Water Resources of the Basin. Consequently, all meetings of the 
Council shall be open to the public, except with respect to issues of personnel.”); see 
also id. § 6.2(1), 122 Stat. at 3760 (“To ensure adequate public participation, each 
Party or the Council shall . . . [p]rovide public notification of receipt of all 
Applications and a reasonable opportunity for the public to submit comments before 
Applications are acted upon.”); STONE, supra note 26, at 44 (noting that “[t]he 
‘injury’ is complete when the right to the procedure is violated” like when an agency 
fails to provide an opportunity for comment after notice of a proposed rule, the 
concrete interest in public participation suffers). 
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redressability.169 Rather, the sole prerequisite that the party must 
prove is the presence of a concrete injury in fact, and as implied in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the standing threshold for this type of 
claim is not particularly difficult to clear.170 
Finally, because it is common for organizations to initiate 
lawsuits, courts have also developed standards for such complainants 
to meet the standing threshold.171 As dictated in Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission, an organization can file suit on 
behalf of its members so long as one of them would establish 
standing individually; its organizational purpose is “germane” to the 
interest alleged in the claim; and lastly, neither the suit nor relief 
requested would require an individual member to participate.172 Even 
though standing can be difficult to satisfy, those wishing to challenge 
actions and decisions in situations involving the environment and 
natural resources should not be dissuaded.173 Further, there are public 
policy reasons for interpreting standing broadly when it comes to 
                                                 
 169. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (“The person who has been accorded a 
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting 
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, 
one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam 
has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental 
impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the 
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam 
will not be completed for many years.”).  
 170. See id. (“There is this much truth to the assertion that ‘procedural 
rights’ are special.”); see also STONE, supra note 26, at 44 (“Scalia suggested that a 
party whose complaint is aimed at vindicating a procedural right has an especially 
low hurdle to clear to achieve standing.”). 
 171. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 
(1977). 
 172. See id. (“Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to 
bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to 
the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”). 
 173. See May, supra note 164, at 140 (“Despite these limits, standing 
doctrine should not prove an insurmountable bar to plaintiffs in natural resources 
cases.”); see e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242-48 (D. Or. 
2016) (holding that plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing requirements in their 
lawsuit alleging that the policies and omissions of former President Obama and 
other executive branch agencies had failed to curb greenhouse gas emissions and 
therefore contributed to a destabilized climate); Trout Unlimited Muskegon White 
River Chapter v. City of White Cloud, 489 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that a nonprofit dedicated to “protecting cold-water [fishing] resources” 
had standing to challenge reconstruction of a dam based on, among other issues, a 
public trust violation claim). 
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such suits, especially as the effects of climate change continue to 
take their toll.174 
B. “Aggrieved” Person Interpretations 
As in the Great Lakes Compact, many statutes state that 
persons must be “aggrieved” to initiate a cause of action.175 However, 
when the statute or law—like the Compact—fails to define 
“aggrieved person,” courts apply the zone-of-interest test to see if a 
challenging party can be classified as such.176 Under this test, a 
person cannot be aggrieved if his or her “interests are so marginally 
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that 
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the 
suit.”177 The Court did not intend the zone-of-interest test to be 
particularly onerous;178 however, resulting interpretations in case law 
exemplify an oscillation between narrow and broad.179 
                                                 
 174. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (holding that 
Massachusetts had standing because “the rise in sea levels associated with global 
warming has already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of 
catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced 
to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek”); see also Mark Squillace, 
Embracing a Civic Republican Tradition in Natural Resources Decision-Making, in 
THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 195, 197 (Lawrence J. 
MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010) (“The proliferation of lawsuits brought by 
an ever growing number of national and local environmental and conservation 
groups attests to their popularity as a vehicle for fostering the protection of 
environmental values, and few would question their significant role in influencing 
public policy.”). 
 175. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. 3739, 3761 (2008). 
 176. See Kristy Meyer, Opponent Testimony–House Bill 473 (As Amended), 
OHIO ENVTL. COUNCIL 1, 4 (2012), http://173.255.227.219/sites/default/files/ 
04_2012_OEC_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DDZ-J2U3] (“When a federal 
statute does not restrict or define ‘any aggrieved person,’ the U.S. Supreme Court 
applies the ‘zone of interest’ test to determine whether a particular plaintiff has the 
right to sue or appeal. To satisfy this test, a plaintiff need not show that Congress 
specifically intended the legislation to benefit them, but rather that ‘the complainant 
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute.’”) (quoting 
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Nat’l 
Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 492 (1998)). 
 177. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). 
 178. Id. (“The test is not meant to be especially demanding.”). 
 179. Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (illustrating 
a narrow interpretation), with Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (illustrating a broad interpretation). See also White 
Lake Improvement Ass’n v. City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 475, 480 (Mich. 
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For instance, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court 
found that the organization was not an “aggrieved person” and 
therefore lacked standing to sue on behalf of the Mineral King 
Valley180 under the Administrative Procedure Act.181 In this case, the 
United States Forest Service approved Walt Disney Enterprises, 
Inc.’s proposal to build a ski resort in the Mineral King Valley, 
which was a largely undeveloped wilderness area.182 In an effort to 
enjoin the project, the Sierra Club filed suit claiming that allowing 
construction of the ski resort would significantly impair the 
environment for present and future generations.183 When faced with 
the threshold determination of whether the Sierra Club had a 
“sufficient stake” in the matter,184 the Court found that a mere interest 
in the problem was not enough.185 Even though the category of 
                                                                                                       
Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a nonprofit organization had standing as an aggrieved 
person under the Water Resources Commission Act to raise a nuisance-abatement 
claim for an injunction to stop the defendant from dumping waste into White Lake). 
 180. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728, 741 (noting that “[t]he Mineral King 
Valley is an area of great beauty nestled in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in Tulare 
County, California, adjacent to Sequoia National Park . . . [and that it] is designated 
as a national game refuge by special Act of Congress”). 
 181. See id. at 741; see also Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 
702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 182. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728-29. 
 183. Id. at 734 (“The injury alleged by Sierra Club [would] be incurred 
entirely by reason of the change in the uses to which Mineral King [would] be put, 
and the attendant change in the aesthetics and ecology of the area . . . . [The Club’s 
claim was] that the development would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the 
scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the 
enjoyment of the park for future generations.”) (citations omitted). 
 184. See id. at 731-32 (“The first question presented is whether the Sierra 
Club has alleged facts that entitle it to obtain judicial review of the challenged 
action. Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy 
to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has traditionally been 
referred to as the question of standing to sue.”). 
 185. See id. at 739-40 (“But a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how 
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in 
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 
‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA. The Sierra Club 
is a large and long-established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause 
of protecting our Nation’s natural heritage from man’s depredations. But if a 
‘special interest’ in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence 
this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a 
suit by any other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization however small or short-
lived. And if any group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such 
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cognizable injuries for standing purposes had broadened to include 
aesthetic, conservational, recreational, and economic values,186 the 
judicial process was not a means to “vindicate . . . value 
preferences.”187 Therefore, because the Sierra Club failed to establish 
in its complaint that the organization or its members would be 
specifically impacted by the development, it lacked standing to 
maintain the action.188 
In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found in 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission that petitioners, a group comprised of conservationist 
nonprofits and three towns, were “aggrieved” parties and therefore 
had standing under the Federal Power Act.189 In this case, petitioners 
challenged the Federal Power Commission’s decision to grant a 
license to a company seeking to build a pumped-storage 
hydroelectric project on the west side of the Hudson River.190 Raising 
concerns over the impact the project would have on economic, 
aesthetic, recreational, and conservational uses “in an area of unique 
beauty and major historical significance,”191 petitioners urged that the 
                                                                                                       
litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona 
fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.”). 
 186. See id. at 738 (“We [previously] noted this development with 
approval . . . in saying that the interest alleged to have been injured ‘may reflect 
“aesthetic, conservational, and recreational” as well as economic values.’ But 
broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a 
different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must 
himself have suffered an injury.”) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)). 
 187. See id. at 740. 
 188. See id. at 735, 741; see also STONE, supra note 26, at xiii (“After all, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned, the Sierra Club itself ‘does not allege that it is “aggrieved” 
or that it is “adversely affected” within the meaning of the rules of standing. Nor 
does the fact that no one else appears on the scene who is in fact aggrieved and is 
willing or desirous of taking up the cudgels create a right in appellee. The right to 
sue does not inure to one who does not possess it, simply because there is no one 
else willing and able to assert it.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 32 
(9th Cir. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). 
 189. See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 
611, 616 (2d Cir. 1965); see also Federal Power Act § 313(b), 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) 
(1958) (“Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued 
by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the 
United States court of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to 
which the order relates is located.”). 
 190. See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 611. 
 191. Id. at 613 (“The highlands and gorge of the Hudson offer one of the 
finest pieces of river scenery in the world.”). 
 Standing Under the Great Lakes Compact 283 
potential injury required that the licensing order be set aside.192 
Rejecting the Commission’s claim that “aggrieved party” should be 
interpreted narrowly under the Act and that petitioners did not satisfy 
the requisite standing elements, the court held that those who have 
demonstrated enough of a special interest in the contested area 
through their activities and conduct are among those aggrieved.193 
Thus, the court evaluated the aggrieved party question based on the 
specific circumstances of the case at hand and allowed the petitioners 
to seek review.194 
Overall, standing is an unavoidable hurdle that a person 
seeking to challenge an action or decision must clear before he can 
have his day in court.195 While the types of injuries that are legally 
cognizable have broadened,196 one must also establish the other two 
standing elements of causation and redressability unless claiming 
procedural injury.197 Moreover, when a particular law like the Great 
Lakes Compact grants standing to any aggrieved person but neglects 
to provide a definition of the term, a question of interpretation 
                                                 
 192. See id. at 611. 
 193. See id. at 616 (“In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission 
will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct 
have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the 
class of ‘aggrieved’ parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act 
gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.”). Compare Rd. 
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“I have concluded 
that these provisions are sufficient, under the principle of Scenic Hudson, to 
manifest a congressional intent that towns, local civic organizations, and 
conservation groups are to be considered ‘aggrieved’ by agency action which 
allegedly has disregarded their interests.”), with Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 
428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The interest asserted in such a challenge to 
administrative action need not be economic. Like other consumers, those who 
‘consume’- however unwillingly- the pesticide residues permitted by the Secretary 
to accumulate in the environment are persons aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute. Furthermore, the consumers’ interest in environmental 
protection may properly be represented by a membership association with an 
organizational interest in the problem.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 194. See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 615 (“[T]he law of standing is a 
‘complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in 
any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual 
situations.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 
U.S. 153, 156 (1953)). 
 195. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra Section II.A. 
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arises.198 And, as Sierra Club v. Morton and Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference exemplify, the interpretation of 
“aggrieved” wavers between narrow and broad depending on the 
particular circumstances at hand.199 Consequently, with decisions 
made under the Great Lakes Compact, the manner in which the 
Compact Council and reviewing courts interpret the aggrieved 
person provision will have the power to set major precedent, 
especially in challenges to the Waukesha Diversion.200 
III. THE WAUKESHA DIVERSION APPROVAL: A FIRST OF ITS KIND 
The Great Lakes Compact faced its first test when the City of 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, submitted an application to divert water from 
Lake Michigan to a location outside the Great Lakes Basin.201 
Because such a diversion would have landmark significance, the 
public watched closely as the Compact Council deliberated and 
evaluated the application’s merits according to the standards outlined 
in the Compact’s provisions.202 When the Compact Council issued its 
final decision approving Waukesha’s request on June 21, 2016, 
opposing organizations immediately expressed their intent to 
challenge it, and one group, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative, did.203 However, because the Compact Council decided the 
merits of the Cities Initiative’s claim notwithstanding its uncertainty 
as to whether the group was an “aggrieved person,” and the Cities 
Initiative ultimately declined to seek judicial review, the issue 
remains unresolved and subject to debate in future challenges to the 
diversion.204 Thus, the situation’s background, the contested 
application process, and the aftermath of the Council’s decision all 
                                                 
 198. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 199. Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (employing 
a narrow interpretation), with Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 616 (employing a broad 
interpretation). 
 200. See infra Part IV (analyzing standing in the context of the Waukesha 
Diversion Approval). 
 201. See Matheny, supra note 10. 
 202. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110-342, § 4.9(3)-(4), 122 Stat. 3739, 3753-54 (2008) (detailing the 
criteria a straddling county must meet in order to be eligible for a diversion). 
 203. See infra Section III.C. 
 204. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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provide the necessary framework to examine the aggrieved person 
standard in this particular context.205 
A. Why Has Waukesha Had Its Eyes on Lake Michigan? 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, has been in search of a new water 
source for its population of approximately 71,000 people for over a 
decade,206 as its public water supply is contaminated with naturally 
occurring radium.207 Because this problem poses a threat to public 
health and violates the Safe Drinking Water Act, the City has been 
under a court order to have a radium-free water supply by 2018.208 
                                                 
 205. See infra Part IV (applying the aggrieved person standard to the 
situation in Waukesha). 
 206. See Behm, supra note 9 (noting that Waukesha has been after Lake 
Michigan water for thirteen years); see also Application Summary, City of Waukesha 
Application for a Lake Michigan Diversion with Return Flow, CH2M HILL, 2-1 
(Oct. 2013), http://www.waukesha-water.com/downloads/1_City_of_Waukesha_ 
Application__Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK3D-KR5N]. 
 207. See Gabe Johnson-Karp, Comment, That the Waters Shall Be Forever 
Free: Navigating Wisconsin’s Obligations Under the Public Trust Doctrine and the 
Great Lakes Compact, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 434 (2010) (noting that the aquifers 
the City gets its water from “have been so depleted that concentrations of 
radioactive radium found in [its] drinking water are above levels recognized as 
acceptable”); see also Application Summary, City of Waukesha Application for a 
Lake Michigan Diversion with Return Flow, supra note 206, at 2-3 (“[T]he deep 
confined aquifer contains radionuclides at concentrations exceeding federal and state 
drinking water standards. Radionuclides (radium-226, radium-228, and gross alpha) 
are naturally occurring elements that pose increased risk of cancer if ingested 
through potable water supplies. Radium is present in the City’s deep aquifer supply 
at levels up to 3 times greater than the drinking water standard of 5 picocurries per 
liter (piC/L).”) (citation omitted). 
 208. See Kozacek, supra note 11 (“Waukesha is under a court order to 
alleviate naturally-occurring radium contamination in the deep aquifers it currently 
uses for municipal supplies, which it notes have dropped 107 meters (350 feet) 
below pre-development water levels.”) (citation omitted); see also GREAT LAKES–
ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, FINAL DECISION 3-4 
(2016) [hereinafter FINAL DECISION], http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Docs/ 
Waukesha/Waukesha--Final%20Decision%20of%20Compact%20Council%206-21-
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/374P-9PJJ]; Press Release, Office of the Mayor, State and 
Waukesha Reach Agreement on Radium Deadline at 1 (July 18, 2017) 
http://greatwateralliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-07-18-PR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YUV5-G557] (“Waukesha had been required to be in full 
compliance by June 30, 2018 under a 2009 agreement with the state. However, its 
planned conversion to a radium-compliant Lake Michigan water supply will not be 
completed until 2023. The new agreement [extending the deadline] recognizes the 
city’s efforts to implement that new water supply and extends the radium deadline 
until Sept. 1, 2023.”). 
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Consequently, Waukesha laid its eyes on Lake Michigan’s pure fresh 
water, believing it to be the only viable alternative source.209 
However, while located a mere seventeen miles west of Lake 
Michigan, Waukesha lies just outside the Great Lakes Basin—a fact 
that would seemingly render it ineligible for a diversion from the 
Great Lakes.210 Nevertheless, even though the City itself sits within 
the Mississippi River Basin, Waukesha County straddles the 
hydrological divide between the two.211 Such a geographical position 
makes the City of Waukesha a community within a straddling county 
capable of applying for an exception to the diversion prohibition 
under the Great Lakes Compact.212 Thus, Waukesha submitted an 
application and became the first community within a straddling 
county to file for a diversion since the Compact’s ratification.213 
B. A Contested Process: The Need for Clean Drinking Water Versus 
Great Lakes Preservation 
Waukesha’s application has been the subject of much 
controversy, and there are meritorious arguments on both sides.214 
Proponents of the diversion emphatically assert that the public health 
crisis makes the diversion a necessity, especially since scientific and 
technical analyses illustrate that Lake Michigan is the only 
                                                 
 209. See Kozacek, supra note 11; see also Behm, supra note 9 (noting that 
Waukesha conducted studies in 2010 about alternative water supplies, which 
concluded that Lake Michigan was “the only sustainable resource available for the 
long term”); Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (stating how the City argued that 
drilling deeper wells would lead to increased levels of radium). 
 210. See Johnson-Karp, supra note 207, at 434 (“Despite the [C]ity’s relative 
proximity to Lake Michigan, Waukesha lies outside the Great Lakes surface water 
basin and has historically drawn its water from sandstone aquifers and from surface 
waters from the Mississippi River Basin.”); see also Application Summary, City of 
Waukesha Application for a Lake Michigan Diversion with Return Flow, supra note 
206, at 1-1. 
 211. See Application Summary, City of Waukesha Application for a Lake 
Michigan Diversion with Return Flow, supra note 206, at 1-1 (“Waukesha County is 
a straddling county because it lies partly within the Great Lakes basin.”). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Johnson-Karp, supra note 207, at 417 (noting that “[t]he first 
community to receive Basin water under the Compact was New Berlin, which lies 
partly within the Basin and whose application for a diversion of Lake Michigan 
water was quickly granted, based on the amounts to be withdrawn and the 
municipality’s location partly within the [B]asin”). 
 214. See Behm, supra note 9 (discussing the varying perspectives on either 
side of the decision). 
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reasonable alternative.215 Moreover, given the fact that it took 
thirteen years and millions of dollars to get its application approved, 
proponents also claim that Waukesha’s application process sets a 
good precedent and will make it difficult for future communities to 
have the same success.216 Further, as dictated in its final decision, the 
Compact Council will closely monitor Waukesha, so the diversion 
will not go unchecked.217 
However, opponents to the diversion remain unconvinced and 
allege that its approval does in fact set a bad precedent that will open 
the floodgates to more requests for Great Lakes water as droughts 
increase and freshwater supplies dwindle.218 Additionally, critics 
                                                 
 215. See FINAL DECISION, supra note 208, at 3-4. 
 216. See Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (“[T]he arduous process Waukesha 
faced in obtaining permission to divert water from Lake Michigan will actually 
make it harder, not easier for any future communities outside the Great Lakes 
watershed to do the same.”); see also id. (“‘Waukesha has been studying and 
analyzing this problem for over 10 years and [has] spent millions of dollars getting 
to this point,’ [Dan] Injerd[, director of water resources for the Illinois Department 
of Natural Resources] said. ‘We’ve set an extraordinarily difficult set of criteria, 
study and analysis that anybody would have to pursue if they wanted to get serious 
about bringing forth an application. To me, there is no slippery slope. The slope, if 
anything, instead of pointing downward, is pointing steeply upward.’”). 
 217. See id. (“Under the new agreement, Waukesha must submit annual 
reports to the compact council documenting the daily, monthly and annual amounts 
of water diverted from Lake Michigan the prior calendar year.”); see also FINAL 
DECISION, supra note 208, at 13 (“For a minimum of 10 years from the beginning of 
return flow to the Basin, the Applicant must implement a scientifically sound plan to 
monitor the mainstem of the Root River to determine changes that may have 
resulted from return flow (such as volumes, water temperatures, water quality and 
periodicity of discharge) in order to adapt future return flow to minimize potential 
adverse impacts or maximize potential benefits to water dependent resources of the 
Basin source watershed (i.e., Lake Michigan).”); id. (“The Applicant must complete 
an annual report that documents the daily, monthly and annual amounts of water 
diverted and returned to the Lake Michigan watershed over the previous calendar 
year.”); id. at 14 (describing the performance audit condition). 
 218. See Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (“Opponents of the water diversion 
proposal had worried that approval could set a bad precedent, opening the doors for 
communities near and far in drought-stricken or contaminated-water areas to start 
draining freshwater from Lake Michigan.”); see also BARLOW, supra note 1, at 18 
(“If water takings from the Great Lakes of North America are similar to those of 
global groundwater takings, the Great Lakes could be bone-dry in eighty years.”); 
Matheny, supra note 10 (“Waukesha’s request was almost universally opposed by 
environmental groups and regional politicians across the Great Lake states, with 
many worried about dangerous precedents being set to provide thirsty outsiders 
access to the Great Lakes.”); Comments on the Waukesha Diversion Application, 
supra note 7, at 7 (“While purely hypothetical, there are many municipalities, 
‘communities,’ that straddle the Great Lakes Basin divide – Chicago, Akron, greater 
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argue that releasing treated wastewater back into a Lake Michigan 
tributary to comply with the Compact’s return flow requirement 
could introduce harmful contaminants and pollutants back into Lake 
Michigan’s waters and ecosystem.219 Ultimately, opponents assert 
that Waukesha is using the Great Lakes as a scapegoat to solve its 
radium problem when it has known about the issue for years yet 
failed to act until tapping into Lake Michigan became a possibility.220 
C. The Decision and Aftermath 
After weighing the arguments on both sides following multiple 
periods of public comment and an in-depth examination of 
Waukesha’s application, the governors of all eight Great Lakes states 
unanimously approved the City’s application to divert water from 
Lake Michigan.221 
As a result of this landmark decision, Waukesha will now be 
allowed to pump up to an average of 8.2 million gallons of Great 
Lakes water per day to provide uncontaminated water for its 
citizens.222 This approved amount is less than the 10.1 million gallons 
Waukesha initially requested in its first application and is the result 
of an amendment designed to ensure that the application more 
effectively complied with the parameters of the Great Lakes 
                                                                                                       
Milwaukee communities are served by an existing ‘straddling’ system. There are 
likely more than 80 counties or similar county provincial areas that straddle the 
Basin divide with many, many more communities all outside the Basin. With 
increasing demand for water exacerbated by climate change, water scarcity, and 
flooding, rapid growth and competition for water in the Basin are anticipated across 
all industry sectors in the next 20 to 30 years.”). 
 219. See Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (“Critics also cautioned that water 
treated at a municipal water treatment plant may contain harmful contaminants that 
could make their way back into Lake Michigan.”). 
 220. See generally Matheny, supra note 10. Candice Miller and Debbie 
Dingell, Republican and Democrat United States representatives from Michigan, 
also critiqued that “[t]he city did not exhaust all other alternatives before requesting 
to siphon Lake Michigan water.” Id. 
 221. See Kozacek, supra note 11 (“Eight Great Lakes governors voted 
unanimously to approve a diversion of Lake Michigan water to the city of 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, which lies just outside of the Great Lakes Basin.”); see also 
FINAL DECISION, supra note 208; Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (“The city of 
Waukesha on Tuesday was given a green light to divert water from Lake Michigan 
for its drinking water supply after eight representatives from the states that border 
the Great Lakes voted unanimously to allow the diversion. A single no vote would 
have scuttled the city’s plan.”). 
 222. See Kozacek, supra note 11. 
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Compact.223 Another amendment to the application included a 
decrease in the water distribution area because the originally 
proposed area extended into four other communities.224 Additionally, 
Michigan further requested that the final decision include a provision 
allowing for routine audits with only thirty days’ advance notice.225 
Likewise, to ensure that the diversion would not go unchecked, 
Minnesota called for the inclusion of an enforcement provision that 
would allow either individual states or the Great Lakes states 
collectively to take action and compel compliance.226 
Waukesha intends to build a water pipeline from Lake 
Michigan to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which lies within the Great 
Lakes Watershed.227 To comport with the Compact’s standards, the 
same amount of water withdrawn must be returned to the Basin.228 
Therefore, Waukesha plans to treat the withdrawn water as 
wastewater and then release it into the Root River, which is a 
tributary that feeds back into Lake Michigan.229 The pipeline plan 
                                                 
 223. See id.; see also Matheny, supra note 10. Michigan Governor Rick 
Snyder told the Detroit Free Press that amendments were “essential to his approval 
of the plan” because they “strengthen[ed] oversight of the agreement’s terms.” Id. 
He also stated, “It’s easy to say no and just walk away[.] . . . I think it’s more 
appropriate to say yes with conditions, because it’s a better answer for the Great 
Lakes itself.” Id. 
 224. See Behm, supra note 9 (noting that the new distribution “area would 
include only the city’s existing water service area, plus several town islands: small 
pieces of the Town of Waukesha surrounded by the city”). 
 225. See id.; see also FINAL DECISION, supra note 208, at 14 (exhibiting the 
incorporation of Michigan’s requested amendment). 
 226. See Behm, supra note 9; see also FINAL DECISION, supra note 208, at 14 
(“This Final Decision will be enforceable by the Compact Council and any Party (as 
defined under Section 1.2 of the Compact) under the Compact pursuant to Compact 
Section 7.3.2.a.”). 
 227. See Don Behm, Milwaukee Wrestles Waukesha Water Deal away from 
Oak Creek, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 31, 2017, 2:01 PM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2017/10/30/milwaukee-
wrestles-waukesha-water-deal-away-oak-creek/803230001/ [https://perma.cc/JVK5-
W4A8] (noting that the original plan was for Waukesha to build the pipeline from 
Lake Michigan to Oak Creek, Wisconsin, but that plan has changed largely due to 
cost savings). 
 228. See Garcia & Schutz, supra note 15 (“Per the rules of the compact, 
Waukesha would have to return the same amount of water it takes from Lake 
Michigan back into the lake.”). 
 229. See FINAL DECISION, supra note 208, at 13 (“The Applicant must return 
to the Root River, a Lake Michigan tributary, a daily quantity of treated wastewater 
equivalent to or in excess of the previous calendar year’s average daily Diversion. 
On any days when the total quantity of treated wastewater is insufficient to meet this 
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will cost around $286.2 million and will not be completed until 2022 
or 2023.230 
Since the plan’s approval, there has already been one challenge 
to the Council’s decision from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative, an international group composed of over 120 
mayors from United States and Canadian communities.231 The group 
requested a formal hearing because it vehemently felt that the 
diversion created bad precedent; it also questioned the transparency 
of the overall decision-making process.232 Because the Great Lakes 
Compact requires that a person be “aggrieved” to challenge Council 
action, the Cities Initiative and the City of Waukesha litigated the 
issue of standing in their briefs and at oral argument.233 In its 
arguments that it was a “[p]erson aggrieved” under the Compact’s 
standards, the Cities Initiative claimed that it “ha[d] standing to sue 
on behalf of the organization itself, . . . ha[d] standing to sue on 
behalf of its members, and . . . has members that would have [had] 
standing to sue individually.”234 The City of Waukesha disputed the 
                                                                                                       
target, all treated wastewater must be returned to the Root River.”); see also 
Kozacek, supra note 11 (publicizing Waukesha’s plans for the Root River). 
 230. See Behm, supra note 227. 
 231. See Ellison, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 232. See id. According to Mayor Denis Coderre of Montreal, “To make sure 
the Compact and Great Lakes are not compromised in the future, this decision 
should be overturned[.]” Id. A statement from the Initiative also asserts that “[t]he 
only public hearing held by the Regional Body that recommended approval was held 
in Waukesha, which is hardly representative of the people in the Region[.]” Id. 
Additionally, the Initiative’s statement alleges that “[w]hen the final decision 
included conditions related to some of the problems with Waukesha’s application, 
no opportunity for comment was permitted on those changes.” Id. See also Cities 
Initiative Reply, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that a “fundamental concern[]” is that 
“the Compact Council did not allow adequate public comment on and refined 
analysis of an evolving diversion” and that “[t]hese additional inputs should have 
been taken into account before making this benchmarking decision”). 
 233. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, §§ 1.2, 7.3(1), 122 Stat. 3739, 3741, 3761 (2008) (containing 
the aggrieved person provision and defining “person”); see also Cities Initiative 
Written Statement, supra note 20, at 13-14 (containing the Cities Initiative’s initial 
standing argument); Cities Initiative Supplement to Written Statement, supra note 
22, at 3-11 (building upon the standing arguments raised in its Written Statement); 
Cities Initiative Reply, supra note 22, at 5-12 (responding to the City of Waukesha’s 
standing arguments); City of Waukesha’s Response, supra note 22, at 6-15 
(containing the City of Waukesha’s standing objections). 
 234. Cities Initiative Supplement to Written Statement, supra note 22, at 3-4. 
In its arguments that it had standing to sue on its own behalf as an organization, the 
Cities Initiative asserted that it has had to reallocate funding and resources to 
diversion education and projects. See Cities Initiative Reply, supra note 22, at 5-6. 
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Cities Initiative’s arguments that it had standing to sue on its own 
behalf and on behalf of the group’s members.235 Nonetheless, despite 
                                                                                                       
“The need to allot funds to this cause prevents the Cities Initiative from carrying out 
other projects that would further its protection of the Great Lakes. And that is an 
injury that confers standing on the Cities Initiative.” Id. at 6. In its arguments that it 
had standing to sue on behalf of its members, the Cities Initiative claimed that it 
satisfied the requirements for organizational standing. Id. It stated that “[t]he 
interests at stake in the Compact Council’s Final Decision on the Waukesha 
Diversion are central to the purpose of the Cities Initiative.” Cities Initiative 
Supplement to Written Statement, supra note 22, at 6. Additionally, “the Cities 
Initiative can pursue this challenge and its requested remedy independently of its 
members.” Id. And finally, “[t]he remedy the Cities Initiative requests consists 
solely of actions to be taken by the Compact Council, and therefore does not require 
any individual member participation.” Id. To support its third argument—that its 
members would have standing to sue individually—the Cities Initiative went 
through the traditional Article III elements of injury, causation, and redressability. 
See id. at 7-11. The group focused on injuries to the members through a weakening 
of the Compact’s legal protections and also specifically on the Mayor of Racine, 
John T. Dickert, and his position as a representative of the City of Racine in the 
Cities Initiative. See Cities Initiative Reply, supra note 22, at 8-12. “[T]he injury the 
mayors and their cities have suffered is a weakening of the protective force of the 
Compact itself, and of all the protections the Compact, which has been enacted into 
federal law, is supposed to provide . . . .” Id. at 8.  
Mayor Dickert has asserted at least two interests that are harmed by the 
Waukesha diversion, and therefore sufficient to confer standing. 
First, . . . the City of Racine invested considerable sums of money in 
making the Root River an attractive waterway for public recreation, and 
the North Beach and Racine Harbor are both key pieces of the city’s 
economy. The Waukesha diversion will damage those interests, thereby 
impairing Mayor Dickert’s interest in the city’s financial health. 
Second, . . . one of [Mayor Dickert’s] obligations as Mayor is providing 
fresh water to the electorate and maintaining sustainable waterways. 
Id. at 10 (citations omitted). Addressing causation and redressability, the Cities 
Initiative asserted that all injuries will be directly because of the Council’s decision 
approving the diversion, and reconsideration of the decision would remedy the 
injuries alleged. See Cities Initiative Supplement to Written Statement, supra note 
22, at 10-11. 
 235. See City of Waukesha’s Response, supra note 22, at 6. (“While the 
Cities Initiative is a ‘person’ for purposes of requesting a hearing under the 
Compact, Waukesha disputes that the Cities Initiative has established that is 
‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of Section 7.3 of the Compact such that it has 
standing to obtain a hearing and to seek judicial review.”); see also In re City of 
Waukesha, supra note 23, at 9 (summarizing how Waukesha “disputes that any 
changes in use of programmatic resources or alleged effects from the return flow 
constitute a particularized, concrete injury sufficient to establish that [the Cities 
Initiative] is aggrieved[,]” how “Waukesha questions the authority of the mayors 
participating in the Cities Initiative to act on behalf of their respective cities to 
challenge the Final Decision absent express approval from the cities’ governing 
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its belief that the group lacked the ability to request a hearing and 
seek judicial review under the Compact, the City of Waukesha 
“strongly urge[d]” the Council to proceed to the merits of the Cities 
Initiative’s hearing request;236 it ultimately did, leaving the question 
of standing under the Compact unanswered.237 
In another unanimous decision, the Compact Council rejected 
the Cities Initiative’s challenge.238 Finding that the Cities Initiative 
did not meet its burden to have the Compact Council reopen or 
modify its decision approving the Waukesha Diversion, the Compact 
Council then declared that the group had exhausted all administrative 
remedies available.239 The Cities Initiative could have kept the 
challenge alive and sought judicial review within the permitted 
ninety-day window the Compact prescribes;240 however, the parties 
reached a settlement containing an agreement to collaborate during 
the review of future diversion applications and to establish an 
advisory committee to draft new procedures and guidelines to assist 
in evaluating them.241 Because of the Cities Initiative’s decision to 
                                                                                                       
bodies[,]” and how “Waukesha also disagrees that Racine will suffer any injury 
from the discharge of return flow to the Root River”).  
 236. City of Waukesha’s Response, supra note 22, at 7, 15 (“In sum, the 
Cities Initiative has failed to establish the prerequisites for standing, either on its 
own behalf or on behalf of its members. Nonetheless, Waukesha urges the Council 
to address the Cities Initiative’s other claims on their merits, so that a reviewing 
court could reach all of the issues raised in the event it disagrees with Waukesha’s 
position on standing.”). 
 237. See In re City of Waukesha, supra note 23, at 1-2 (“This 
Opinion . . . explains that the Compact Council reached the merits of the Cities 
Initiative’s arguments notwithstanding uncertainty that the Cities Initiative has 
shown itself to be a ‘person aggrieved’ by the Final Decision and thereby entitled to 
a hearing under Section 7.3.1 of the Compact.”). 
 238. See id. at 8 (noting how “the Compact Council unanimously decided 
that the Cities Initiative has not met its burden”). 
 239. See id. at 51-52 (“As of May 4, 2017 (the date of the issuance of this 
opinion), all administrative remedies available to the Cities Initiative relating to the 
Compact Council’s Final Decision dated June 21, 2016 In the Matter of the 
Application by the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin for a Diversion of Great Lakes 
Water from Lake Michigan and an Exception to Allow the Diversion (No. 2016-1), 
are hereby exhausted.”). 
 240. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, §§ 1.2, 7.3(1), 122 Stat. 3739, 3741, 3761 (2008) (asserting 
the judicial review must be sought within ninety days). 
 241. See Press Release, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, 
Mayors and Governors Reach Agreement to Improve Water Diversion Application 
Process (Aug. 2, 2017), https://glslcities.org/water-diversion-application-agreement/ 
[https://perma.cc/QKX7-27LM]; see also Wilson, supra note 25 (“In exchange for 
not pursuing a legal remedy, representatives for the governors, known as the 
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drop its challenge and forgo judicial review, standing under the Great 
Lakes Compact’s aggrieved person provision remains without 
precedent.242 
Overall, the Waukesha Diversion Approval is historic for a 
number of reasons.243 Given the gravity of its impact, it is 
unsurprising that one challenge to the decision, though settled, 
already occurred.244 If new challenges formulate, the Compact’s 
aggrieved person provision heightens in importance and will play a 
major role as other persons potentially exhaust all other remedies and 
attempt to seek judicial review.245 
IV. THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT AND THE WAUKESHA DIVERSION: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE 
“AGGRIEVED PERSON” STANDARD IN LIGHT OF PUBLIC TRUST 
PRINCIPLES 
It is no secret that the Great Lakes, constituting one-fifth of the 
world’s water supply, are of unrivaled importance and value.246 Their 
precious contents are a highly coveted treasure, and desires for 
diversions from those outside the Great Lakes Basin are a logical 
outgrowth of this notion.247 Nonetheless, the progressive history of 
Great Lakes management based on public trust principles illustrates 
an evolving commitment against this practice with leaders expressly 
recognizing the pervasive dangers diversions pose to the waters and 
the ecosystem as a whole.248 Thus, the Compact Council’s decision to 
approve the City of Waukesha’s request to tap into Lake Michigan is 
monumentally significant, and the contentious nature of the entire 
                                                                                                       
Compact Council, agreed to establish and work with an advisory committee to 
update procedures on how to handle future water diversion requests.”). 
 242. See In re City of Waukesha, supra note 23, at 10 (acknowledging that 
the Council did not “fully resolv[e] whether the Cities Initiative is a ‘[p]erson 
aggrieved’ and thereby entitled to a hearing”). 
 243. See Matheny, supra note 10 (discussing the historic nature of the 
decision). 
 244. See Ellison, supra note 19. 
 245. See § 7.3, 122 Stat. at 3761. 
 246. See Great Lakes Facts and Figures, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 247. See Olson, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing the correlation between the 
increasing global water demand and pressure on the Great Lakes as a source of fresh 
water). 
 248. See supra Part I (discussing the entrenchment of the public trust 
doctrine in the Great Lakes states and charting the history of key developments in 
Great Lakes governance); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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process made a challenge like the Cities Initiative’s inevitable and 
leaves open a possibility for others in the future.249 
Consequently, a critical hurdle for those embarking on judicial 
review is establishing standing.250 Pursuant to the Great Lakes 
Compact, any aggrieved person can seek judicial review upon 
exhausting all other administrative remedies.251 Because the Compact 
does not explicitly define the meaning of “aggrieved” within its 
framework, a question of interpretation exists.252 Given the 
immeasurable value of the Great Lakes and their status as public 
trust waters, the potential gravity of impact the Waukesha Diversion 
may have on them, and the possible ramifications for future cases 
beyond Waukesha, the Council’s decision deserves the utmost 
scrutiny.253 Therefore, the Compact Council and reviewing courts 
should interpret the aggrieved person standard broadly in light of 
public trust principles so as not to preclude meaningful review in this 
unique context and to most effectively comport with the Compact’s 
overarching purpose—safeguarding the waters in perpetuity.254 
A. The Great Lakes: An Indispensable Resource Warranting the 
Utmost Protection 
Water constitutes the most fundamental and sustaining human 
need.255 All life forms depend upon it, and its presence is absolutely 
                                                 
 249. See Matheny, supra note 10 (noting how the decision to approve the 
Waukesha Diversion “mark[ed] the first test case of the Great Lakes Compact”); see 
also supra Section III.B-C (discussing the controversy surrounding the decision, the 
primary arguments proponents and opponents presented, and the Cities Initiative’s 
challenge). 
 250. See STONE, supra note 26, at 35 (noting that standing is a justiciability 
filter that a litigant must satisfy). 
 251. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. 3739, 3761 (2008) (“After exhaustion of 
such administrative remedies, . . . any aggrieved Person shall have the right to 
judicial review of a Council action.”). 
 252. See id. § 7.3, 122 Stat. at 3761-62 (revealing that the word “aggrieved” 
is not defined in any provision of the Enforcement section of the Great Lakes 
Compact); see also id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3739-42 (illustrating that the word 
“aggrieved” does not appear in the Definitions section of the Great Lakes Compact). 
 253. See infra Section IV.A-B (discussing the immense value of the Great 
Lakes, highlighting the precedential nature of the Waukesha decision, and analyzing 
why scrutiny is pivotal to protect the waters in perpetuity). 
 254. See infra Section IV.B (applying the standing principles to Waukesha); 
see also § 1.3(1)(f), 122 Stat. at 3742-43. 
 255. See SHARING WATER IN TIMES OF SCARCITY, supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
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vital to the existence of the planet.256 Containing six quadrillion 
gallons of water and constituting one-fifth of the world’s fresh 
surface water supply, the Great Lakes are a critical component of the 
overall global water source.257 Moreover, the Great Lakes represent 
84% of all fresh water within North America, and they 
correspondingly hold approximately 95% of the United States’ 
available supply.258 Given their immense presence, people all across 
the Great Lakes Basin depend upon them for a variety of purposes;259 
nevertheless, their value, especially as a drinking water source, 
makes them “crown jewels” and worthy of stringent protection as 
part of the public trust corpus so that they are not diminished for 
generations to come.260 Recognition of this principle and the 
influence that the public trust doctrine should have on Great Lakes 
management decisions is pivotal as these bodies of water continually 
face a multitude of threats growing in intensity, especially as the 
effects of climate change persist.261 
Diversions represent just one of these issues facing the Great 
Lakes.262 While appreciation for the dangers diversions pose has been 
a common and progressive theme throughout the history of Great 
Lakes governance, it is quickly rising to the forefront as one of the 
                                                 
 256. See id. 
 257. See Great Lakes Facts and Figures, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See, e.g., Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 723 (asserting that twenty-
three million people rely upon the Great Lakes for drinking water); Olson, supra 
note 96, at 1121 (acknowledging that the people within the Great Lakes region rely 
upon the waters for domestic, industrial, and navigational purposes); see also supra 
Section I.A (illustrating how the public trust doctrine, which is firmly rooted and 
recognized in each of the eight Great Lakes states, exists to protect the public’s use 
rights). 
 260. See BARLOW, supra note 1, at 67 (noting how the Great Lakes should be 
managed as a trust for the benefit of the public good); Moll et al., supra note 3, at 3 
(calling the Great Lakes the “crown jewels” of North America’s freshwater system); 
Olson, supra note 2, at 151 (asserting that the Great Lakes states all recognize the 
public trust doctrine’s applicability to the Great Lakes). 
 261. See supra Subsection I.A.2 (describing how the public trust doctrine is 
well-recognized in each of the Great Lakes states); see also Hall & Houston, supra 
note 5, at 725 (“The Great Lakes are beset by pollution from industry, afflicted by 
eutrophication due to agricultural fertilizers, invaded repeatedly by nonnative 
species, threatened by climate change, and eyed by more arid regions for diversions 
to ease water shortages in other areas of the country.”). 
 262. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 725. 
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chief concerns among Great Lakes advocates.263 As clean, drinkable 
fresh water grows increasingly scarce amongst varying parts of the 
country because of pollution and drought-induced water shortages, 
the pressure to tap into the Great Lakes and rely upon them as an 
alternative drinking water source intensifies.264 Consequently, those 
empowered with the responsibility to protect and serve as guardians 
of the Great Lakes, including both the Compact Council and courts 
reviewing challenges to Council action, should be perpetually 
cognizant of this dilemma to most effectively comport with their 
public trust obligations and the Compact’s overall purpose.265 
Further, the interconnected nature of the Great Lakes, the 
longstanding acknowledgement of the importance of basin-wide 
management, and public trust principles need to serve as guiding 
considerations, especially when evaluating whether a party seeking 
judicial review has standing as an aggrieved person under the 
Compact.266  
B. Standing and Challenges to the Waukesha Diversion Approval: A 
Broad-Based Argument 
Standing is a foundational prerequisite for judicial review.267 It 
is an unavoidable requirement that a party seeking to bring a cause of 
action in court must satisfy.268 As prior case law declares, the 
standing analysis is context dependent based upon the individual 
                                                 
 263. See supra Part I. Each of the key developments in the history of Great 
Lakes management addressed the problem of diversions to varying degrees. See 
supra Part I. From the ratification of the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909 to the 
enactment of the Great Lakes Compact in 2008, decision makers’ commitment 
against diversions has progressively strengthened. See supra Part I. 
 264. See Olson, supra note 6, at 33 (noting how the global water demand is 
increasing and so is the desire to access the Great Lakes). 
 265. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 1.3(2)(b), (f), 122 Stat. 3739, 3743 (2008) (professing that 
among the several purposes of the Great Lakes Compact include “remov[ing] causes 
of present and future controversies” and “prevent[ing] significant adverse impacts of 
[w]ithdrawals and losses on the Basin’s ecosystems and watersheds”); see also 
Kilbert, supra note 50, at 6 (explaining the obligations that the public trust doctrine 
imposes). 
 266. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing the aggrieved person provision 
in the Great Lakes Compact and how “aggrieved” is undefined). 
 267. See STONE, supra note 26, at 35 (discussing standing as a requirement 
to “get through the courthouse door”). 
 268. See id. 
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circumstances pertaining to the particular case at hand.269 
Consequently, while the Supreme Court has delineated the traditional 
elements of standing that a challenging party must demonstrate,270 
there is flexibility in how courts elect to interpret them.271 This 
flexibility will prove to be critical as any new challenges to the 
Compact Council’s decision approving the City of Waukesha’s 
application to divert 8.2 million gallons of water per day from Lake 
Michigan arise—or in challenges to new diversions in the future.272 
Given the treasured value of the Great Lakes and the precedential 
nature of the Compact Council’s decision, reviewing courts should 
appropriately exercise their discretion, tread with caution, and 
interpret the aggrieved person standard outlined in the Compact’s 
dispute resolution provision broadly; this interpretation should be 
informed by the public trust principles that have historically 
influenced the waters’ management.273 
Parties seeking to challenge the Compact Council’s decision 
approving the Waukesha Diversion will have to achieve both 
constitutional and statutory standing to effectively attain judicial 
review upon exhaustion of all other administrative remedies that the 
Compact provides.274 Consequently, those opposed to the action will 
first have to show that they have suffered a concrete and 
particularized “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent” instead of 
                                                 
 269. See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 
608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965) (“[T]he law of standing is a ‘complicated specialty of 
federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less 
determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations.’”) (quoting United 
States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953)). 
 270. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that 
standing requires an “irreducible constitutional minimum” of three elements). 
 271. See STONE, supra note 26, at 49 (“The standards for standing are not the 
same in each setting.”). 
 272. See Kozacek, supra note 11 (establishing that the final approved 
amount for the diversion was 8.2 million gallons per day); see also Press Release, 
supra note 241 (discussing the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative’s 
settlement with the Compact Council). 
 273. See supra Section IV.A (addressing the value of the Great Lakes); see 
also Kozacek, supra note 11 (acknowledging that the Waukesha Diversion Approval 
is of “landmark” significance as the first of its kind under the Great Lakes 
Compact). 
 274. See supra Part II (discussing how the legislature can further 
circumscribe the standing threshold in a statute); see also Great Lakes–St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. 
3739, 3761 (2008) (“After exhaustion of such administrative remedies, . . . any 
aggrieved Person shall have the right to judicial review of a Council action.”). 
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“conjectural” or “hypothetical.”275 In the context of Waukesha, 
reviewing courts should willingly make this finding in favor of any 
future challenger because, as the Supreme Court dictated in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, aesthetic and environmental interests are legally 
cognizable injuries for the purposes of establishing constitutional 
standing.276 Therefore, if a challenger is capable of showing that he 
has been injured in some way based on these types of interests, then 
this first prerequisite should not serve as a rigid barrier.277 Finding the 
existence of injury in the context of the Waukesha Diversion also 
aligns with the public’s vested right in Great Lakes protection, which 
every Great Lakes state recognizes in its legal framework.278 Given 
the immeasurable importance of the Great Lakes as the source of 
95% of the available fresh water in the United States and as a 
resource upon which so many other economic, social, and cultural 
activities depend, this interpretation of the injury element to standing 
is demonstrably prudent.279 
Nonetheless, the strongest argument against the existence of 
injury in the context of Waukesha is that any purported injury is too 
speculative since the pipeline necessary for the diversion to occur 
will not be completed until at least 2022.280 From this perspective, 
reviewing courts should find that a challenging party has not yet 
suffered any detriment because the impacts of the diversion will 
remain unknown until Waukesha actually begins pumping the 
water.281 While this assertion has strong merit, its practical effects are 
                                                 
 275. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”‘”) 
(citations omitted). 
 276. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (recognizing that 
aesthetic, recreational, conservational, and economic values are all viable interests 
capable of suffering an injury for standing purposes); see also May, supra note 164 
and accompanying text. 
 277. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738. 
 278. See supra Subsection I.A.2 (outlining how the Great Lakes states have 
integrated the public trust doctrine and its corresponding principles into their 
constitutional provisions, statutes, and jurisprudence). 
 279. See Great Lakes Facts and Figures, supra note 2 (citing how much of 
the United States’ water supply the Great Lakes contain); see also Hall & Houston, 
supra note 5, at 723 (describing the enormity of the Great Lakes); id. at 725 (noting 
that there are a “diversity of values, interests, and priorities at play” in the Great 
Lakes Basin). 
 280. See Behm, supra note 227. 
 281. See FINAL DECISION, supra note 208, at 13 (outlining the specific 
reporting requirements with which Waukesha must comply). 
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incompatible with the overarching purpose of the Compact and the 
urgent need to protect the Great Lakes in perpetuity in accordance 
with public trust principles.282 If concerns about speculation were to 
triumph, then irreparable harm could occur to the waters simply 
based on a technicality.283 Therefore, reviewing courts should 
consciously recognize the existence of injury in any future 
challenges to Waukesha due to the unique position of the Great 
Lakes in the ecosystem and in society as a whole.284 
Causation is the next constitutional standing prerequisite that a 
party seeking to challenge the Waukesha Diversion approval would 
have to satisfactorily establish.285 In this context, showing causation 
would mean the Compact Council’s decision is causally connected or 
“fairly . . . trace[able]” to the party’s alleged injury.286 This element 
presents a seemingly challenging hurdle because the Great Lakes 
face a multitude of threats on a continuing basis.287 As a result, the 
primary concern here would be the ability to effectively demonstrate 
that the alleged injury was not caused by some other unknown factor 
like a preexisting diversion, such as that in Chicago.288 However, 
given the unprecedented nature of the Waukesha Diversion’s 
approval and the fact that the injury must simply be fairly traceable 
to the Compact Council’s conduct, causation, like injury, should not 
prohibit judicial review of the decision.289 
                                                 
 282. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110-342, § 1.3(1)(a), 122 Stat. 3739, 3742 (2008) (“The Waters of the 
Basin are precious public natural resources shared and held in trust by the States.”). 
 283. See id. § 1.3(1)(d), 122 Stat. at 3742 (“Future Diversions . . . of Basin 
Water resources have the potential to significantly impact the environment, 
economy and welfare of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River region.”). 
 284. See Moll et al., supra note 3, at 3 (emphasizing the Great Lakes’ vital 
position within North America’s freshwater system). 
 285. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of.”). 
 286. See id. at 560-61 (noting that “the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] 
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court’”) (quoting Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 
 287. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 725 (asserting that aside from 
diversions, the Great Lakes face problems ranging from pollution to eutrophication, 
invasive species, and climate change); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 142-43 
(expounding upon the threats facing the Great Lakes). 
 288. See Hall & Houston, supra note 5, at 756 (noting that the Chicago 
diversion presently involves the pumping of water at 3,200 cubic feet per second). 
 289. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (implying that causation does not require 
absolute certainty). 
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The final constitutional element that a party challenging the 
approval of the Waukesha Diversion would have to show is 
redressability.290 In this context, demonstrating redressability would 
mean that a favorable decision from the reviewing court would likely 
provide an adequate remedy to the injury alleged.291 Because of the 
monumental significance of the Waukesha Diversion’s approval, a 
court decision enjoining the diversion after finding that the Compact 
Council acted improperly would remedy an alleged injury resulting 
from it.292 Moreover, because the chance of redressability must be 
one of probable likelihood rather than absolute certainty, the 
evidence in favor of finding its existence is even stronger.293 In sum, 
when conducting the basic constitutional standing analysis, 
reviewing courts should appreciate how the magnitude of the Great 
Lakes as a resource pushes the traditional boundaries of standing and 
integrate the public trust principles so deeply engrained in their 
management framework to find that the three elements of injury, 
causation, and redressability exist.294 
A subsidiary route worth briefly mentioning that may be 
available to those opposing the Compact Council’s decision is to 
raise a procedural injury claim.295 An allegation of this nature would 
arise if the Council failed to comply with a statutorily mandated 
procedural requirement.296 The key here is that if a procedural injury 
occurred, the challenging party would only have to show injury and 
                                                 
 290. See id. at 561 (asserting that the third standing requirement is 
redressability). 
 291. See id. (“Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”) (quoting Simon, 426 
U.S. at 38, 43). 
 292. See Ellison, supra note 19 (noting that opponents to the Waukesha 
Diversion Approval, like Mayor Denis Coderre of Montreal, believe that overturning 
the decision will “make sure the Compact and Great Lakes are not compromised in 
the future”). 
 293. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra Section IV.A (describing the importance of the Great Lakes); 
see also Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615 
(2d Cir. 1965) (affirming that the standing analysis is context dependent and should 
take the unique circumstances of the situation at hand into account); Olson, supra 
note 2, at 151 (noting how public trust principles have “remained constant and 
flourished over time in . . . all of the Great Lakes states”). 
 295. See supra Section II.A (discussing procedural injuries as an alternative 
route to the traditional standing process). 
 296. See STONE, supra note 26, at 44 (discussing how this type of injury 
occurs upon the defendant’s failure to follow a requisite procedure). 
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not causation or redressability for constitutional standing purposes.297 
Thus, the standing threshold is a lower obstacle to overcome.298 The 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative made allegations 
equivalent to procedural injuries, criticizing the approval process’s 
lack of transparency.299 For instance, the Initiative asserted that the 
only public hearing was conducted in the City of Waukesha, a 
location that is clearly unrepresentative of the entire population 
composing the Great Lakes region.300 Further, it cited a lack of 
opportunity to comment on certain conditions that were included in 
the Final Decision addressing some of the issues pertaining to 
Waukesha’s application.301 If these required procedures were 
violated, then a group like the Cities Initiative should have 
constitutional standing to obtain judicial review.302 However, because 
the Cities Initiative declined to seek judicial review of the Compact 
Council’s decision rejecting its procedural claims through its 
settlement agreement, no further litigation on this facet as it applies 
to standing occurred; another challenger could theoretically still 
attempt a procedural injury claim.303 
Nonetheless, even when a party meets all the constitutional 
standing prerequisites, the issue of statutory standing still remains 
because laws, like the Great Lakes Compact, can declare that a 
person must be aggrieved to initiate a cause of action.304 When the 
                                                 
 297. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (“The 
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can 
assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy.”). 
 298. See STONE, supra note 26, at 44 (asserting that Scalia implied this lower 
threshold with procedural injuries when he wrote the Lujan opinion). 
 299. See Ellison, supra note 19; see also Cities Initiative Reply, supra note 
22, at 1 (stating the Initiative’s concern regarding a lack of adequate public 
comment). 
 300. See Ellison, supra note 19. The Initiative’s critique of the public hearing 
process amounts to a procedural injury claim since public participation is a 
mandated requirement in the Great Lakes Compact. See also Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 6.2, 122 
Stat. 3739, 3760 (2008). 
 301. See Ellison, supra note 19 (describing how the Initiative’s complaint 
includes the lack of opportunity to comment on changes that appeared in the Final 
Decision). 
 302. See STONE, supra note 26, at 44. Standing would be established because 
with procedural injuries, “[t]he ‘injury’ is complete when the right to the procedure 
is violated.” Id. 
 303. See Press Release, supra note 241; see also Wilson, supra note 25. 
 304. See § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761 (establishing that the Compact requires a 
person to be “aggrieved” to seek judicial review). 
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statute neglects to explicitly define who qualifies as aggrieved under 
its framework, courts subsequently apply the zone-of-interest test to 
see if the challenging party can be classified as such, and as case law 
demonstrates, interpretations oscillate between narrow and broad.305 
Moreover, under this test, statutory intent is key because the sole 
focus is whether the challenging party’s interests are related to and 
consistent with the statute’s underlying purpose.306 The zone-of-
interest test applies to the Great Lakes Compact because “aggrieved” 
is undefined within the framework of the document.307 However, 
since the Compact Council addressed the merits of the Cities 
Initiative’s challenge without deciding whether the Cities Initiative 
had standing, its written opinion provides no guidance, leaving the 
issue unresolved and open to future debate.308 Accordingly, how 
reviewing courts apply the test and elect to interpret the aggrieved 
person standard in any future challenges to the Waukesha Diversion 
will be critical.309 Because of the precedential power of the 
Waukesha Diversion approval, the Great Lakes’ undeniable value, 
and the Basin’s interconnected nature, it is imperative that courts 
recognize a wide zone of interest and interpret aggrieved broadly in 
light of the public trust principles entrenched in the Compact’s 
framework and the history of Great Lakes governance.310 
As the evolution of Great Lakes governance history indicates, 
the drafting and ratification of the Great Lakes Compact signified the 
                                                 
 305. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Compare Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (interpreting “aggrieved” narrowly and holding 
that the Sierra Club did not have standing), with Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (interpreting “aggrieved” 
broadly and holding that a group of conservationist nonprofits and three towns did 
have standing). 
 306. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (establishing 
that a person cannot be aggrieved if his “interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be 
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit”). 
 307. See § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3739-42 (illustrating that the word “aggrieved” 
does not appear in the Compact’s definition section). 
 308. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Matheny, supra note 10 (highlighting that the Waukesha Diversion 
Application is “the first test case of the Great Lakes Compact”). 
 310. See id. (discussing the potentially dangerous precedent that those 
against the diversion fear the Council’s decision sets); Garcia & Schutz, supra note 
15 (reiterating the fact that many are weary of the impact the Waukesha Diversion 
Approval may have in the future); see also § 1.3(1)(b), 122 Stat. at 3742 (“The 
Waters of the Basin are interconnected and part of a single hydrologic system.”); id. 
§ 1.3(1)(a), (f), 122 Stat. at 3742-43 (incorporating public trust principles into the 
Compact); supra Part IV.A (describing the indispensable value of the Great Lakes). 
 Standing Under the Great Lakes Compact 303 
historic culmination of longstanding efforts to protect the Great 
Lakes from systemic and basin-wide threats.311 This 
acknowledgement that the lakes are one unified system has truly 
been the backbone of all continual efforts to most effectively manage 
this vital resource.312 Consequently, the Great Lakes Compact’s 
succinct declaration that the lakes are held in trust for the people of 
the region encapsulates the drafters’ aspirations and how they 
intended its provisions to protect a wide range of people and 
interests; it also signifies their desire to incorporate public trust 
principles into the Compact’s framework.313 Thus, when considering 
any future challenges to the Waukesha Diversion brought under the 
Compact’s enforcement provision, a broad interpretation of 
“aggrieved,” like the Second Circuit employed in Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, most 
adequately, effectively, and forcefully comports with the Compact’s 
overall purpose.314 
The situation at hand with Waukesha is analogous to that in 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference first and foremost because 
both involve a governing body’s decision to permit an action capable 
                                                 
 311. See supra Part I (tracing the pivotal moments in the history of Great 
Lakes governance from the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to the eventual Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact). 
 312. See, e.g., Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra note 82, at 51 (noting 
that the Great Lakes Charter of 1985 recognized that the Great Lakes Basin waters 
are all “interconnected and part of a single hydrologic system”). This recognition of 
the lakes’ interconnected nature manifests through the corresponding aversion to 
diversions appearing in the Water Resources and Development Act of 1986, the 
Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001, and ultimately in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Resources Compact. See Olson, supra note 96, at 1121 
(discussing how the Water Resources and Development Act explicitly 
acknowledged the impact diversions could have on the Great Lakes Basin as a 
whole); see also § 1.3(1)(b), 122 Stat. at 3742 (recognizing explicitly that the Great 
Lakes Basin waters are all interconnected); Scanlan, Sinykin & Krohelski, supra 
note 82, at 56 (noting that under the Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001, preventing 
or mitigating water loss from the entire Great Lakes Basin should be the overarching 
goal). 
 313. See § 1.3(1)(a), 122 Stat. at 3742; see also id. § 1.3(1)(f), 122 Stat. at 
3742-43. 
 314. See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 
608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (“In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will 
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct 
have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the 
class of ‘aggrieved’ parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act 
gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.”). 
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of having a detrimental impact on an important body of water.315 
When faced with the petitioners’ challenge to the Federal Power 
Commission’s licensing decision in Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference, the court explicitly recognized that those who 
demonstrate enough of a special interest in the contested area 
through their activities and conduct are considered aggrieved for 
standing purposes and that the interpretation of aggrieved is context 
dependent.316 These two principles particularly resonate with the 
situation in Waukesha and support the broad interpretation of 
“aggrieved” to include a vast array of persons throughout the Great 
Lakes Basin because, as the Compact declares, future diversions of 
Great Lakes water “have the potential to significantly impact the 
environment, economy[,] and welfare of the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River region.”317 Thus, given the Compact’s recognition of 
interconnected impacts, the Compact Council and courts reviewing 
challenges to the Waukesha Diversion should interpret “aggrieved” 
broadly to best effectuate this principle and fulfill their duty as 
trustees in accordance with public trust principles.318 
Rooted in support for the Waukesha Diversion, the most logical 
critique against interpreting “aggrieved” broadly in challenges 
brought under the Great Lakes Compact is judicial economy.319 From 
this perspective, if reviewing courts employ an overly inclusive zone 
of interest, then the floodgates will open to challenges from any 
individual claiming to have a “special interest” in the situation.320 
Accordingly, this cascading effect would in turn frustrate the 
                                                 
 315. See Kozacek, supra note 11 (noting that Waukesha Diversion involves 
Lake Michigan and the Root River—its connecting tributary); see also Scenic 
Hudson, 354 F.2d at 611, 613 (discussing how the Federal Power Commission’s 
licensing decision involved the Hudson River, which was “an area of unique beauty 
and major historical significance”). 
 316. See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 616 (delineating that one may be among 
the class of those aggrieved if he “exhibit[s] a special interest” in a particular area 
through his activities and conduct); see also id. at 615 (holding that standing 
necessitates analysis based on the “specific circumstances of individual situations”) 
(quoting United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 
(1953)). 
 317. § 1.3(1)(d), 122 Stat. at 3742. 
 318. See id. § 1.3(1)(f), 122 Stat. at 3742-43. 
 319. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (discussing how 
allowing a lawsuit based on a mere interest in the problem blurs the line between 
those having a bona fide interest and those who do not). 
 320. Id. (noting how a wide zone of interests negates any “objective basis 
upon which to disallow a suit”). 
 Standing Under the Great Lakes Compact 305 
function and purpose of judicial review.321 Nevertheless, while this 
argument is strong, the situation with Waukesha—and diversions 
from the Great Lakes in general—necessitates special attention.322 
Given the delicate and vital resource at stake and that this was the 
first test case of the Great Lakes Compact, extreme caution should 
prevail over judicial economy, and “aggrieved” should be interpreted 
broadly in a manner informed by public trust principles to not unduly 
limit and preclude judicial scrutiny.323 
The Waukesha Diversion Approval is just the beginning of 
what could be an onslaught of applications to divert Great Lakes 
water, especially as populations continue to rampantly increase and 
freshwater sources dwindle.324 Therefore, recognizing a broad zone 
of interest and correspondingly what it means to be aggrieved under 
the Great Lakes Compact will perpetuate the longstanding 
philosophy that has persevered throughout the history of Great Lakes 
governance: The lakes and the Basin as a whole are deeply 
interconnected and demand protection as such because they are a 
public trust resource.325 A critical mechanism for championing this 
fundamental tenet is to embrace legal challenges and close scrutiny 
of Compact Council action.326 Consequently, standing should not be 
a hindrance.327 
                                                 
 321. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The 
redressability requirement of standing implies that an overarching function and 
purpose of judicial review is to rectify the injury claimed. See id. 
 322. See supra Part III (discussing the Waukesha Diversion Approval); see 
also Matheny, supra note 10 (noting that the Waukesha Diversion Approval 
signified “the first test case of the Great Lakes Compact”). 
 323. See supra Section IV.A (emphasizing the immeasurable value of the 
Great Lakes as a water resource and public trust asset); see also Matheny, supra 
note 10. 
 324. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra note 312 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I 
(discussing the Great Lakes as a complex resource that correspondingly necessitates 
intricate management for protection). 
 326. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 7.3, 122 Stat. 3739, 3761 (2008) (containing the Compact’s 
enforcement provisions expressly enabling legal challenges and review of Council 
action). 
 327. See STONE, supra note 26, at 35 (noting that a party cannot “get through 
the courthouse door” without establishing standing). 
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CONCLUSION 
As the first true test case of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Resources Compact, the Waukesha Diversion’s 
approval represents a landmark in the history of Great Lakes 
governance.328 Because of the controversy that plagued the whole 
application process, it is unsurprising that one group already 
attempted to challenge it.329 However, since the Compact Council 
bypassed a standing determination to reach the merits of the claim, it 
did not set any precedent to govern how the Compact’s aggrieved 
person provision will be interpreted in future challenges or diversion 
cases.330 To comport with the overall purpose of the Compact and 
effectively protect the Great Lakes waters and ecosystem in 
perpetuity, the aggrieved person provision in the enforcement section 
of the Compact should be interpreted broadly in light of public trust 
principles to grant concerned persons and organizations standing 
before the Compact Council and in judicial review.331 Interpreting 
“aggrieved person” broadly is in accordance with case law that has 
recognized the value in environmental interests, and it will best 
enable members of the Compact Council to uphold their duty as 
trustees of the source of one-fifth of the world’s fresh surface 
water.332 
                                                 
 328. See supra Part III (describing the situation surrounding the Waukesha 
Diversion Approval). 
 329. See supra Section III.C (chronicling the Cities Initiative’s challenge). 
 330. See In re City of Waukesha, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
 331. See supra Part IV. 
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